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Preface
ADR in theWorkplaceis an initiativeof the Committeeon Law andPublic Policyof the.
Societyof Professionalsin DisputeResolution(SPIDR).The purposeof theinitiativeisto describe
theprocesses,practices,andoutcomesof existingandemergingdisputeresolutionactivitiesin the
workplace.Begunin 1996underthe leadershipof SPJDR presidentsChristinaSicklesMerchant
andS.GlennSigurdson,theworkof theinitiativehasbeenorganizedintothreetracks:TrackI,ADR
in theEmploymentSector;TrackII,ADR in theOrganizedWorkforce;andTrackIII, International
StructuresandtheRole ofWorkplaceADR Globally.The goalof theinitiative,overallandwithin
eachtrack,is to fosterbetter-informedconsumersandmoreskilledprovidersof workplaceADR
serVIces.
TrackI, co-chairedbyAnn-A.Goslineof Gosline,Reitman,& AinsworthDisputeResolution
andLamontStallworthof the Instituteof IndustrialRelations,LoyolaUniversity,focusedinitially
onthework of agencieschargedwith enforcingworkplacerights.Workingthroughaseriesof drafts
thatwerecirculatedandcommentedon byabroadcross-sectionof thedisputeresolutioncommu-
nity,includingrepresentativesof theUnited StatesEqualEmploymentOpportunityCommission
andotherUS. andCanadianenforcementagencies,theTrackI committeecompleteditsfinalreport
in late1997.EntitledGuidelinesfor VoluntaryMediationProgramsInstitutedbyAgenciesChargedwith
EnforcingWorkplaceRights,thereportwasformallyadoptedby the SPIDR Boardof Directorson
January24,1998.At thissamemeeting,theboardalsoapprovedamotionsupportingtheNational
AcademyofArbitrators'oppositiontoagreementsimposingarbitrationofstatutoryrightsasacOl1dition
of employment.TrackI ispresentlyatworkonguidelinesandprinciplesof goodpracticefor internal
employerdisputeresolutionsystemsforstatutoryemploymentdisputes.Thatreportwill becompleted
sometimein theyear2000.
The first draftof Track II's FacilitatingConflictResolutionin Union-ManagementRelations:A
Guidefor Neutralswasproducedby a smallworkinggroupconsistinKofThomasA. Kochan,MIT
SloanSchoolofManagement;ChristinaSicklesMerchant,disputeresolutionconsultant;JoelCutcher-
Gershenfeld,MIT andBabsonCollege;andRichard Chaykowski,Queen'sUniversitySchoolof
IndustrialRelations.As with theTrackI report,theTrackII reporthasbeenbroadlycirculatedand
revised,basedon feedbackfrominterestedparties,includingsessionsattheSPIDR annualmeeting
in Portland,Oregon,in October1998. .
The work ofTracksII andIII hasbeenconductedin collaborationwith otherinstitutions.The
HewlettFoundation,theMassachusettsInstituteofTechnology,andCornellUniversity'sInstituteon
Conflict Resolutionprovidedfundingfor thework ofTrackII. The Programon Negotiationat
HarvardLaw SchoolprovidedfinancialsupportforTrackIll's studyof theroleof NorthAmerican
disputeresolversin conflictresolutionanddisputesystemsdesignthroughoutheworld.As of this
writing,TrackIll's studyisnotyetcomplete.
All thosewho have.-workedon thisprojectare-gratefulto Cornell University,andQueen's
Universityfor supportingthepublicationof thisreport.Becausethetheoryandpracticeof interest'-
basedprocessesin union-managementegotiationsandproblemsolving;re evolvingatarapidrate,
theauthorsconsiderthisapreliminaryreport.It isour hopethatpublishingthereportwill makeit
morewidelyavailableandusefulto thosewho areworkingin thischallengingareaof practice.It is
alsoour hopethatthereportwill sparkfurtherdebateandcontinuedrefinementof theideasand
principleswehaveattemptedto describe.
To encouragea continuingdialogue,SPIDR has,establisheda threadedconversationon the
internet.Thosewishingto participatein thisconversationor simplyto readwhatothersaresaying
cantunein athttp/www.spidr.org.
HomerC.La Rue,President,SPIDR
NancyE. Peace,InitiativeCo-Chair
GeraldW.Cormick,InitiativeCo-Chair
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Introduction
Over fiftyyearsagoGeorgeTaylor,oneof
the mosthighly respectedlabor-management
neutralsof his time,calledfor third partiesto
takeon whathe termed"a mantleof responsi-
bility for labor-managementrelations."Today,
wide rangesof practitionersareassumingthis
responsibility.They areplayinga varietyof in-
ternaland externalroles,aslabor arbitrators,
mediators,consultants,facilitators,disputesystem
designers,leadersservingon joint committees,
andcountlessothers.Theseindividualstriveto
riseabovethepartisanpressuresthatarefoundin
anyunion-managementrelationshipby helping
to resolvedisputes,fosterproblemsolving,and
buildnewinstitutionalrelations.In doingso,they
arehelpingtheinstitutionof collectivebargain-
ingadaptin waysnecessaryfor it tocontinueto
beakeysocietalelementinto thenextcentury.
Asdisputeresolutionprofessionals,weneed
to understandtherangeofpracticesnowfound
in differentrelationships,the typesof roles
neutralsmightplay,andtheprinciplesthatshould
guideneutralsastheycarryouttheseroles.The
purposeof thisreport,therefore,is to outline
principlesfor SPIDR members,otherneutrals,
andthepartieswho utilizetheservicesof third-
partyneutralsin contemporarylabor-manage-
mentrelations.
Specifically,wehavethreetargetaudiences
in mind:.laborrelationsneutrals,steepedin thein-
stitutionalnuancesof industrialrelations(pri-
marilyarbitratorsandmediators),whoarebeing
challengedtohelppartiesadaptonewcircum-
stances;.third-partyneutralsexperiencedin set-
tingsoutsideof laborrelationswho areor will
beworkingwith partiesin unionizedsettings;.internalfacilitatorsandchangeagents(£rom
laboror management)who arehelpingto solve
problemsandresolvedisputesin theworkplace.
Somepointsin thisreportmaybe com-
pletelyobviousto onepartof thetargetaudi-
encebut anessentialcautionto another.Some
of the recommendationswill be controversial
sincetheyreflectanactivistviewof third-party
roles.Importantly,thisisnotanoverallguideto
bestpracticefor labor-managementrelations;
instead,it is aguideto theroleof disputereso-
lution professionalsin the labor-management
context.We hopethatit stimulatesfurthercon-
structivedialoguein theprofession.
1
StartingPremises:
The Roleof CollectiveBargainingin Society
Work is fundamentalto thedevelopment
of our individualandsocialidentities,our psy-
chologicalwell-being,andour economic.wel-
fare.Sincework servesmultipleobjectivesand
interestsin so~iety,conflictis an expectedpart
ofworkplacerelationshipsandexperiences.How
we managecompetingworkplaceinterestsand
change,andthe resultingconflict,is therefore
essentialtothedevelopmentofaprogressive,civil
societyandastrongeconomy.Overmostof the
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courseof thiscentury,collectivebargaininghas
servedasanimportantinstitutionfor resolving
conflictsand promotingproblem solving in
employmentrelationships.By giving voice to
workerandemployerconcernsandimproving
workplacedemocracy,collectivebargainingalso
servesanimportantdemocraticfunctionin our
communitiesand,increasingly,in transnational
institutionsandforums.
Traditionally,collectivebargainingad-
dressedworkerandemployerconcernsin peri-
odic negotiatio'nsin which the partieswere
motivatedto reachanagreementby thethreat
of a strikeor lockout.Agreementswerethen
implementedandadministeredwiththehelpof
agrievanceprocedureculminatingin arbitration
beforemutuallyacceptableneutrals.Labor-man-
agementcommitteesandothercooperativefo-
rums were encouragedand arosein various
industriesandcompaniesin responsetospecific
problemsor wartimecrises.
But the lawspassed ecadesagoto regu-
latecollectivebargainingviewedlabor-manage-
ment relationsas essentiallyan arm's-length
adversarialrelationship.Managementretainedthe
right to makestrategicdecisionsaboutthedi-
rectionoftheenterpriseandtomanagethebusi-
ness.In return,the union gainedthe right to
negotiatethetermsandconditionsof employ-
ment(e.g.,wages,hours)andtheeffectsofmana-
gerialdecisionson conditionsof employment,
aswell astheoptionto fileagrievanceif indi-
vidualor collectiverightscoveredin the con-
tractwereviolatedbyamanagerialaction.
But, in thecontextof theemergingnew
economy,thistraditionalmodelisno longerad-
equate for meeting the needs of today's
workforceor maintaininga competitiventer-
priseandeconomyathighstandardsof living.
Indeed,asthetraditionalmodeldeclinesthrough-
out theU.S.economyandin severalkeyCana-
diansectors,it is at risk of losingitseconomic
andpoliticalpowerin oursocieties.Increasingly,
partieschoosealternativeformsof disputereso-
lution,includingmediation,adjudication,anda
varietyof hybridprocesses(mediation/arbitra-
tion or earlyneutralevaluation,fact-finding,
ombudsmen).In addition,the perceivedvalue
Box1
ADR in theu.s. FederalWorkplace
U.S.federalaborrelations
from1962to 1993tendedto be
highlyadversarialandlitigious.
Thisstateof laborrelationswas
illustratedmostdramaticallyby
thePATCOstrike(1981),in which
over10,000airtrafficcontrollers
werefiredbyPresidentReagan
for engagingin a workstoppage
overfailedcontractnegotiations.
TheU.S.federalservice'slabor
relationsprogramhasmultiple
third-partypoliciesandstruc-
turesfor resolvingdifferent
disputes.Theseincludethe
FederalLaborRelationsAuthority
(FLRA)for representation
questions,unfairlaborpractices,
negotiabilitydisputes,and
reviewof arbitrationawards;the
FederalServiceImpassesPanel
(FSIP)forsettlementof negotia-
tion impasses;theMeritSystems
ProtectionBoard(MSPB)for
appealof adverseactions;the
EqualEmploymentOpportunity
Commission(EEOC)fordiscrimi-
nationcomplaints;andtheOffice
of SpecialCounsel(OSC)for
investigationandresolutionof
whistleblowercomplaints.
Againstthisbackdrop,the
NationalPerformanceReview,led
byVicePresidentGore,identified
theareaof humanresource
management,andlaborrelations
in particular,asneedinga
varietyof interventionsto play
its partin "creatinga govern-
mentthatworksbetterandcosts
less."Asoneof theproductsof
theNationalPerformanceReview,
PresidentClintonsignedExecu-
tiveOrder12871,entitled
"Labor-ManagementPartner-
ships,"in October1993..The
ordermandatedaLLexecutive
agencyleadershipto achievea
"true"partnershipwiththeir
counterpartlabororganizations
asa preconditionfor "reinvent-
ing"thefederalworkplace.
Moreover,thepartieswere
instructedto use"alternative
disputeresolutionprocessessuch
asconsensualdecisionmaking
andInterest-BasedNegotiations"
asthepreferredmethodsfor
arrivingat redesignedand
restructuredworkplaces.These
effortsarenowproducing:
. extensivetrainingof
supervisorsandemployeesin the
natureanduseofalternative
disputeresolution(ADR)pro-
cessesto preventandresolve
disputes;.highlevelsofexperimenta-
tionwithADRprocessesfor
resolvingoutstandingdisputes
betweenparties,fromsimple
unfairlaborpracticesto com-
plex,maturelitigation;
. jointleadershipandsupport
bytop laborandmanagementin
facilitatingthechangetoward
moreconstructivedispute
resolutiondealingsat the local
level;.multipleffortsbythe
partiesto redesigndispute
resolutionsystems-process,
capability,andstructure-within
wholeagenciesin orderto
achievegreaterinstitutionaliza-
tionofADR;and.extensivemeasurement
initiativesto tracktheresultsof
ADRwithrespecto directand
indirectcosts,impactonrela-
tionships,durabilityof resolu-
tionsachieved,andsatisfaction
withoutcomes.
Thechallengeforthird-party
neutralsis to keepupwiththis
rapidpaceof changeandto add
valueto it asit evolves.
Source:ChristinaS.Merchant
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of collectivebargainingasa public good has
continuedto erode,andmanyemployerscon-
tinuetoviewcollectivebargainingwithconsid-
erablehostility.
Yet,collectivebargainingandunion-man-
agementrelationsareasimportantodayasever
to ahealthyeconomyanda strongdemocracy.
The needto achievemorecompetitivework-
placestogetherwith an increasingstandardof
livingmerelyincreasestheimportanceof inno-
vative,cooperativelabor-managementrelations
andeffectiveconflictresolution.'Collectivebar-
gaining,therefore,needsto beadaptedandim-
proved,notabandoned.
The challengesfacingthisinstitutionvary
acrossectorsof theeconomy.In theprivatesec-
tor;therearedeeplyembeddedcollectivebar-
gainingrelationshipsandtraditionalapproaches
toconflictresolution.Thesearebeingchallenged
by organizationalrestructuring,theentranceof
new firmsin existingmarkets,andnew work
systems.Beyondthe structuralchanges,deep
culturalchangesaretakingplace,drivenbyshift-
ing demographicsand changingassumptions
aboutwork,employment,andchangeitself.In
this context,conflictresolutionandproblem-
solvingprocessesarehighlyvalued'bysomeasa
necessarypartofthesolutionandfearedbyothers
asathreato establishedinstitutions.
In the public sector,the pressuresfor
privatization,accountability,andreorganization
createsimilardynamics,withadditionalpolitical
overtones.Here,aswellasin theservicesector,
the-changingroleof servicedeliveryprocesses
addsa furtherdynamicto disputeresolution
systems.Expectationsarehigh, and thoseto
whomtheserviceisprovidedaremoreassertive
aboutexpressingthem.This pressure,addedto
thehighvisibilityofgovernmentandsomeother
serviceproviders,putsanadditionalburdenon
disputeresolutionsystems.Regardlessof the
sectoror context,hepublicis increasingly
concernedoverthe costsof conflictand the
qualityof relationships.
In traditionalcollectivebargaining,inter-
estsarenegotiatedperiodicallyandcodifiedin a
writtenagreement.Disputesarelegitimateonly
whenposedasquestionsof individualor group
rightsspecifiedin the contract.Formalproce-
dureswith well-definedstepsandrolesfor par-
ticipantsareestablishedto resolvethesedisputes.
The resultingsystemis a cultureof rightsand
obligationsthatfosters tabilityanduniformity.
In contrast,todaymanyworkersandemployers
wantprocessesfor disputeresolutionandprob-
lem solvingthatareflexible,informal,timely,
adaptable,affordable,and customizedto their
specificcircumstances.
Manypartiesarerespondingtothedictates
of theneweconomyandredesigningtheirbar-
gainingrelationshipsandconflictresolutionpro-
cesses.(SeeBox 1for anexamplefromtheUS.
federalsector.)The scope,character,androleof
theseprocessesareundergoingprofoundchange.
We believethischangemustnot onlycontinue
butaccelerate.
Effectiveneutrals(to paraphraseGeorge
Taylor)needto takeon themantleof encour-
aging,supporting,andfacilitatingconstructive
changeandinnovationin collectivebargaining.
If wearesuccessful,wewill helpthepartiesre-
ali.zeanewvisionforcollectivebargainingsuited
to theneedsoftoday'sworkforceandeconomy.
If wefail,thenextgenerationmaylosetheeco-
nomicandsocialbenefitsof thiskeyinstitution.
Our task,therefore,is to identifythenew
conflictresolutionprinciplesthatareemerging,
encouragetheiruseby disputeresolutionpro-
fessionals,andgivethembroadvisibilityin the
laborrelationscommunity.
2
ContemporaryPractices
This sectiondescribesthe wide arrayof
structures,forums,andprocessesthathavebeen
introducedto improvelabor-managementrela-
tionshipsandperformance(seeTable1).We are
notadvocatingthesepracticesforallunion-man-
8
agementrelationships.Instead,wepresenthem
asinnovationsthathavedemonstratedtheirvalue
for somepartiesandthereforearecommonly
beingexperimentedwith in differentsettings.
Sometimestheyaresuccessful,sometimesnot.
Table1
Innovationsin DisputeResolution
Levelsof activity Selectedinnovations Illustrativeroles
Employeeinvolvementgroups,workplace
teams,otherjoint activities
Newworksystemdesignandoperations
Workplaceoperations
Workplacedisputeresolutionsystems
Grievancemediation
Group/teamfacilitator
Projectfacilitators,consultants,
trainers
Arbitrators
Mediators,designconsultants
Collectivl;!bargaining Mediationof collectivebargaining
disputes;labor-managementcommittees/
councils;interest~basednegotiations
Mediators,facilitators,consult-
ants,trainers
Strategiclevel Union-managementpartnerships
Employeeownership
Consultants,mediators,trainers,
facilitators
Designconsultants
Sectoral/communitylabor-management
committees/cou~cils;multi-party
commissions/forums;privatediscussion
forumsandprofessionalssociations;
policyhearingsandlegislative-processes
Community/sectoral/
societallevel
Convenors/facilitators,staff
experts,members,witnesses
Our taskisnottoendorseanyof thembut
to summarizetheconditionsthat,accordingto
our research,will givethesepracticesthebest
chanceof succeeding.Our specialfocusliesin
identifYingprinciplesfor neutralsto considerif
theyareaskedto participatein theseactivities.
In today'sworkplace,differentpeoplepre-
fer differentwaysto resolveproblemsanddis-
putes.In recentyearsdisputeresolutiontheory
hasreflectedthisdevelopmentby emphasizing
theimportanceofhavingarangeof choicesthat
canbetailoredto thespecificsituation.The dis-
pute resolutionspectrumshownin Figure 1
presentsa sampleof approachesand methods
ranging from prevention and negotiation,
Figure1
TheDisputeResolutionSpectrum
throughfacilitationandfact-finding,toadvisory
andimposedapproaches.
Thekeydistinctionsuggestedbythisspec-
trum concernsthe degreeof controlretained
by disputantsovertheir own dispute.A long-
standingpropositionin disputeresolutiontheory
is thatdisputesarebestresolvedclosesto the
source.In fact,dramatichangesnowtakingplace
in systemsactuallydo plac~responsibilityand
authorityin thehandsof disputants.The parties
areseekingabroaderangeofoptionsin match-
ingdisputestotheirneedsandpreferences.These
choicesmatterin thatdifferentprocesseswill
generatedifferentsubstantiveandrelationship
outcomes-allof whichinvolvenewor chang-
-.1 preve~tive.~
. Dispute
Source:Adaptedfrom Costantin{)andMerchant,1996.
.
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Table2
Tradi~ionalandEmergingThird-PartyRolesinUnion-ManagementRela ions
Role Functions
Arbitrator Hearsandevaluatesevidencein adisputeandissuesabindingdecisionoraward.
Mediator Assistsparties'negotiations,bothsubstantivelyandprocedurally,sothatthey
mayreachasettlementthatbothvoluntarilyaccept.
Managesgroupprocessesin waysthathelpthepartiesinteracteffectivelyand
achievehigh-qualityoutcomes.
Experthiredbypartiesto helpdesignandimplementinnovationsandchanges.
Expertwhoteacheskillsandencourageslearningthatthepartiescanthenapply
ontheirown.
Expertwhohelpspartiesbuildandimplementacomprehensiveconflictresolution
systemwithmultipleoptionsforresolvingdisputes.
Facilitator
Consultant
Trainer
Systemdesigner
ingthird-partyroles.
The rolesof arbitratorsandmediatorsare
well establishedin labor-managementrelations,
andtheserolescontinuetobecentraltothepro-
cessesof industrialjurisprudenceand dispute
resolution.In recentyears,however,additional
roleshaveemergedinvolvinginternalandex-
ternal forms of facilitation,implementation,
training,andinformalmediation.Our focusis
primarilyon thesenewerroles,thoughwewill
alsoaddressomeof the waysthatarbitrators
andmediatorsarebeingaskedto stepoutside
theirtraditionalroleswithrespecttolabor-man-
agementrelations.Someof thetraditionaland
emergingrolesaredefinedinTable2.It should
berecognized,however,thattheserolesareof-
ten combinedin creativeandnew ways,and
thus few professionalsadheresttictly to the
genericdefinitionslistedhere.Indeed,asDunlop
- andZack (1997)note,someneutralshavealways
seentheirroleasthatofan"impartialchairman"
in theGeorgeTaylormoldandthereforehave
mixedarbitration,mediation,andotherprocesses
asthesituationrequired.Whatthese xpertstress
is thatneutralsneedto understandhow their
roleschangeastheymoveacrossor combine
differentprocesses( eeBox 2).Theymustavoid
confusingthepartiesorcreatingadditionalcon-
flictsby inappropriately"transportingassump-
tions"fromoneroleinto another.
In the sectionsthatfollow
we outlinethe changingnature,
scope,and domainsof contem-
porary labor-managementrela-
tionsandsomeof thenew roles
thirdpartiesarebeingcalledupon
to playaslaborandmanagement
adaptwithinandacrossthesedo-
mains.Webeginattheworkplace
andmoveupwardthroughthene-
gotiationsprocesstostrategic-level
interactions.Thenwelookbeyond
individualbargainingrelationships
to community, sectoral, and
national-levelinteractionsneeded
tosupportworkplacechangesand
innovations.
In each section, we first
place the developments and
processesin theirhistoricalcon-
text,then outline principlesor
guides for action.A summary of
all guidingprinciplesis included
attheendof thisreport.
Box2
Mixing Multiple Roles/Functionsasa Neutral
Managingthechangesin our
rolesaswemoveacrossor
combinedifferentdispute
resolutionprocessesi a major
professionalchallengeweface
asneutralstoday.Thisbecomes
particularlysensitiveandsubtle
wherethereis a comminglingof
rolessuchasmediationand
arbitrationthatinvolvesa
changein theneutral'srespon-
sibilityforoutcomes.
Asa neutralmovescloserto
ownershipOra stakein th_e
ownershipof theoutcome(asis
thecasein movingfrom
mediationto arbitration)oris
perceivedto bemovingin that
direction,it becomesmore
likelythatthepartieswill start
negotiatingwiththeneutralas
opposedto eachother.If this
happens,it compromisesthe
neutral'sabilityto assistthe
partiesin negotiatingwitheach
other.Thepartiesmusttherefore
becarefulto assesswhatthey
needfroma neutralin a given
setting,andneutralshouldbe
carefulto understandand
communicateheirroleandthe
expectationsandresponsibilities
of eachpartyastheymove
acrosstheseboundaries.
Source:Correspondenceto the Task
Forcefrom GlennSigurdson,SPIDR
pastpresident
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WorkplaceOperations
FacilitatingEmployeeInvolvement
andWorkplaceInnovat:ions
Employeeinvolvement(EI) or qualityof
workinglife (QWL) programswereamongthe
earliestformsof directemployeeparticipation
to gainwidespreadattentionin the late1970s
andearly1980s.The 1973nationalagreements
betweentheUnitedAutoWorkers(UAW) and
eachof thebig threeU.S.automobilecompa-
niescontainedlanguagencouraginglimiteduse
of "off-line" problem-solving roupsin plants
on a voluntarybasisaslong astheydid not in
anywaychangethelanguageor rightscovered
in thecollectivebargainingagreement.A national
committeewasto be establishedateachcom-
panyto overseeandmonitorthe evolutionof
theseQWL orEI groups.Later,in the1980sand
1990s,well-known examplesof variousem-
ployeeinvolvementandjointunion-management
initiativeswereintroduced,eitherinformallyor
throughcollectivebargaining,acrossavarietyof
industriessuchastextiles,mining,autos,steel,
and telecommunications(including Xerox,
AT&T, andBell Canada).In unionizedsettings,
someprogramshaveinvolvedemployeesandnot
theunion,while othershavebeenjoint union-
managementcommittees(e.g.,labor-manage-
ment participationteams in the U.S. steel
industry;processreengineeringteamsat Sask-
Tel in telecommunications).
Earlyon,failurerateswerehighasthepar-
tiesrecognizedthattheseeffortscouldnot be
completelyseparatedfromcollectivebargaining
issuesorinstitutionalrrangements.Programsthat
succeededin addressingthisissuewhenit arose,
suchasatXerox,expandedtheirscopeandex-
periencedgreatersuccessandlongevity.Those
thatdidn'tatrophiedorwereabandonedbecause
of conflictswith existingcollectivebargaining,
union, or employerstructuresor oppositional
forces.
One problemwith theseearlyeffortswas
thattheywereoftenviewedbyunionleadersas
anti-union.They wereseenasunionavoidance
tacticsorasinstrumentsfor drivingawedgebe-
tweenmembersandelectedofficersandslowly
underminingthe authorityof the union.This
viewwasunderstandablesincemanynon-union
companieshadbeeninnovatorsin the useof
employeeinvolvement,particularlyin greenfield
(new)operationsthatcompaniesweredeter-
minedto openandmaintainon a non-union
basis.This legacyhashauntedeffortsto intro-
ducemanyworkplaceinnovationsin labor-man-
agementrelations.
In additiontoemployeeinvolvementprob-
lem-solvinggroups,otherjoint workplacein-
novationshavefocusedon issuesof healthand
safety,training,andapprenticeships.Safetyand
healthcommitteesbothhavealonghistoryand
arethemostcommonformofjoint labor-man-
agementcommitteefound in industrytoday.
More recently,joint activitieshavebeenestab-
lishedaroundissuesof quality,employmentse-
curity,employeebenefits,andothermattersof
mutualinterest.As well,variousformsof" on-
line"employeeinvolvementhaveemergedin the
formofproductionteams,cross-functionalteams,
servicedeliveryteams,andotherjointlygoverned
groupactivities.Thesejoint initiativesevolveand
changeovertime,with third-partyroleschang-
ingaswell.
The primarythird-partyrole associated
withoff-lineparticipationactivitiesisthatof the
groupand/orprojectfacilitator.
1. Thefacilitatormustbeacceptabletobothunion
and managementleadersand tootherkeystakeholders.
It is union andmanagementleaderswho
selectandsanctionindividualsin theseroles.Fa-
cilitatorsmaybeinternalto theunionor man-
agementorganizationor theymaybeselectedas
externalfacilitators.It iscriticalthatfacilitatorsde-
velopandmaintainthetrust,respect,andsupport
of both laborandmanagementrepresentatives
andtheir constituents/superiors.Sometimesa
facilitatormustbereadytostepasideif theneces-
sarytrustandconfidencecannotbeachievedor
arelostwithoneor moreof theparties.
In onecase,theinitialconsultantbrought
in by thecompanywasunableto developthe
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necessaryrapportwith theunionleaderswhile
hisyoungerassistantwasableto do so.The re-
sult:thecompa~yandunionhiredtheyounger
consultantwho subsequentlyhelpedthemde-'-
velop andsustaina successfulpartnershipfor
nearlytwentyyears.In turn, the more senior
consultantwentontofacilitatemanyotherjoint
union-managementchangeefforts.Thus,asin
traditionalmediation,a facilitatorin thesecases
mustrecognizethatpersonalrelationshipsmat-
ter a greatdeal;matchesaresituation-specific
andsometimesrequireoneto stepasideif th~
matchis not developingfor one reasonor an-
other.
2. Thefacilitatormustensurethatthejointac-
tivitieshaveappropriate,jormalsanctionviathecol-
lectivebargainingagreementor otherjoint policy
documents.
Mostsuccessfulnion-managementefforts
havelanguage.intheircollectiveagreementsor
in letters/memorandaofagreementthatprovide
an initial degreeof sanctionand supportfor
groupparticipationactivities.Often,theexperi-
encewith employeeinvolvementand related
joint activitieswill leadto periodicadjustments
and expansionof the sanctioninglanguage.A
facilitator,then,not only workswithin a con-
tractualmandatebutalsoidentifiesareaswhere
thatmandateneedstobeadjusted.This,in turn,
requiressensitivityandunderstandingof how
thebargainingprocessopera,teswithinbothla-
bor andmanagementorganizations.
Oneoftheclearestimplicationsoftheearly
EI experiencesi thattheseprocessescannot,over
time,staylimitedto issuesnot coveredby col-
lectiveagreements.Workersandline managers
naturallywantto discusstheissuesthataremost
importantothemandtotheiroperations.Oth-
erwise,problemscannotbesolvedandrootcause
analysesarestymied.Therefore,thepartiesneed
to work out waysto addresstheseissueswith
respecto.theproceduresfor modifYingcollec-
tiveagreements.Box 3 containsexcerptsfrom
contractlanguagesanctioningone of thebet-
ter-knownexamplesof how thiscanbe done:
thejoint-studyproceduresgoverningthepoten-
tialoutsourcingofworkin theXerox-ACTWU
(nowXerox-UNITE) bargainingunit.
3. Facilitatorsneed toensureactivejoint "own-
ership"if theprocess.
A facilitatorshouldnot be workingwith
participationgroupsin asettingwhereeitherthe
union or managementleadershipis in aninac-
tiveor secondaryrole.Whereonlyoneof these
partiesisdrivingtheprocess,thereisagreatrisk
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thatconstructivegroupeffortswill beundercut
bythelackof checksandbalancesathigherlev-
els,or thatnecessarypoliticalsupportand/or fi-
nancialresourceswill be cut off the firsttime
theprogramexperiencesacrisisof oneformor
another.
More specifically,~nionscantake,or be
viewedby managementastaking,oneof three
rolesin employeeinvolvement:(1)activeoppo-
sition,(2)neutrality-not directlyinvolvedbut
allowingit to happen,or (3)joint partnership.
We believeit is not only inappropriatebut
unworkablefor neutralsto attempto facilitate
employeeinvolvementeffortsin unionizedset-
tingswithout the'activeinvolvementof the
union.Wheretheunionisopposedweurgepro-
fessionals'toworkwith laborandemployerep-
resentativesto overcometheopposition.Failure
to dosoimpliesthattheemployeeparticipation
processwill becomeor isalreadyembroiledin a
largerlabor-managementconflictthatmustbe
resolvedbeforeit is feasiblefor a neutralthird
partyto facilitatetheemployeeinvolvementef-
fort.If theconflictisnotresolved,thethirdparty
shouldnotserveasafacilitator.Wheretheunion
takesaneutralbutuninvolvedrole,theprocessis
alsoatrisk.While thismaynot be groundsfor
withdrawingor decliningto serve,it is awarn-
ing signthattheprocessis unstableandefforts
needto be madeto includetheunion leader-
shipmore,fullyin theprocess.Joint oversightis
essentialtoensurethattheprocesshasjoint own-
ershipandcommitmentsto seeit throughpiv-
otaleventsandchallenges.
4. Facilitatorsneedtoensurethatmechanisms
Jor disputeresolutionandQtherJormsoj dueprocess
arebuiltintoanyparticipativeinitiative.
Inevitably,workerparticipationeffortsen-
counterbarriersor internalconflictsthatcan-
notberesolvedatthelevelof dailyoperations.
Manycanberesolvedwithinthegroup.In some
cases,a form of appealis required-up aman-
agementor unionhierarchy,or to variousjoint
steeringcommitteesor otherforums.A facilita-
tor who workswith groupsin theabsenceof
suchaproceduremustcreatetheprocessadhoc
whensuchdifficultiesareencountered,whichis
substantiallymoredifficultthandoingsoin ad-
vance.
FacilitatingtheDesignand
Operationsof New Work Systems
Team-basedworksystemsandotherwork-
placeredesigninitiativesareincreasinglycom-
Box3
SanctioningLanguagein a CollectiveBargainingAgreement
A CaseExampleonSubcontracting:AgreementbetweenXeroxCorporationandLocal14a,The
XerographicDivision,ACTWU1994-2001.ExcerptsfromArticleII, SectionB:Subcontracting
WhentheCompanydeterminesthrough costof obtainingsuchworkfromexternal
[cost]analysesthatworkofsatisfactory sources.
qualitycannotbeproducedcost-competie WhentheCompanyandtheUnionagree
tivelybythebargainingunit,theCompany thattheTeam'srecommendationswill make
shall: theproductionstudiedcost-competitive
a. NotifytheUnionaccordinglyand-share withexternalsources,theCompanyandthe
theresultsof suchanalysiswiththeUnion. Unionshallhavetheauthorityto negotiate,
b.Establish,in conjunctionwith the within a reasonableperiodof time, an
Union,appropriateEmployeeInvolvement agreementthateffectuatesuchrecommen-
StudyTeams. dations.
Withina reasonableperiodof time,the TheCompanymaysubcontractworkwhen:
appropriateEmployeeInvolvementStudy a. An EmployeeInvolvementStudyTeam
Teamshall: advisestheCompanyandtheUnionthatit is
a.Reviewtherelevantcost-comparison unableto formulateproposalswhichwill
analysis. rendertheproductionstudiedcost-competi-
b. Investigatealternativeproduction tivewithexternalsources,or
methods,processes,equipment,materials, b.TheCompanyandtheUnionareunable
andanyotherfactorswhichaffectinternal to negotiateanagreementthateffectuates
productioncosts.. therecommendationsof aTeam,or
c. AdvisetheCompanyandtheUnionthat c.An Employee-InvolvementStudyTeam's
theTeamis unableto formulateproposals adviceor recommendationshavenotbeen
whichwill rendertheproductstudiedcost- submitted,ortheCompany-Unionnegotia-
competitivewithexternalsources,or tionshavenotbeenconcluded,withina
d. Recommendto theCompanyandthe reasonableperiodof time.
Unionthosemethodsandprocesses,changes .
in thetermsandconditionsof employment, Source:1994-2001Ca/lediveBargainingAgreement
and capital investments,which could render betweenXeroxCorporationandLocal14A malgam-
the productionstudiedcompetitivewith the atedClothingandTextileWorkersUnion
mon in workplacestoday.They representa di-
reci:contrast. othetraditionalworksystemswith
individualjob descriptions,clearlydefinedre-
sponsibilitiesandboundaries,eniorityrulesgov-
erningpromotionand transfer,and payrates
associatedwith individualjobs.The movement
to new work systemstouchesthe heart of
collectiveagreementsandmustbesanctionedin
the agreement.All the principleslistedabove
thereforeapplyto thesesystems,alongwith an
additionalsetof considerations.We distinguish
betweenintroduction of teamsystemsinto
greenfield(new)andbrownfield(existing)sites.
5. It is inappropriatefor third-partyneutralsto
assistemployersin settingupgreenfieldsitesintended
in part orprimarilytoavoidunionization.Doing so
destroysthefacilitator'sneutralityandacceptabilityin
labor-managementrelations.
The designof anew or greenfieldopera-
tion offersimportantopportunitiesto consider
new,state-of-the-artapproachestoorganization
designandemploymentrelations.Becausesuch
decisionsinvolvesizableinvestments,omeem-
ployerstendtokeepplansfornewfacilitiescon-
fidential.Someemployershavealsousedthese
opportunitiestocreateandmaintainthenewsites
asnon-unionfacilities.This, however,furthers
workeranduniondistrustof newwork systems
andunderrriinesconstructivelabor-management
relations.Externalconsultantsoftenplayanim-
portantrolein exploringandbenchmarkingthe
range.ofoptions.There(ore,neutraldisputereso-
lutionprofessionalsshouldnotparticipatein the
designingof newfacilitiesoasto avoidunion-
ization.
Yet experienceshowsthatjoint explora-
tiop of optionsfor organizingwork and em-
ploymentrelationsystemscanleadtosignificant
innovationandbroadbuy-intonewapproaches.
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A keytaskof neutralsin thisactivityisto ensure
thatallthecriticalstakeholdersareinformedand
participatein thedesigneffort.
6. Facilitatorsneed toassisthepartiesin reach-
ing agreementsgoverningtheprocessfor deciding
whetherornotworkersinanewfacilitywillberepre-
sentedbythe.union.
The processfordecidingwhetheror nota
unionwill representworkersin anewfacilityis
a necessaryandcriticalcomponentof theplan
forthenewfacility.The facilitatorshouldensure
thatthepartiesaddressthisissueaspartof the
planandreachagreementon how representa-
tionalissuesareto bedecided.
In somecasesrecognitionis donevolun-
tarilyaspartof thejoint studyprocess.In others
unionandemployerrepresentativesagreeonrules
of conductfor allowingworkersin thenewfa-
cilitytodecidewhetherornottoberepresented
if an organizingeffortis begun.While theap-
proachmayvary,it is criticalfor agreementon
thisissuetobereachedaspartof thedesignpro-
cess.One of thebest-knownexamplesof this
typeof joint studyprocess,the"Committeeof
99" thatdesignedthepartnershipbetweenthe
SaturnCorporationandtheUnitedAutoWork-
ers(UAW),is describedin Box 4.
Introducingteam-basedor otheralterna-
tivework systemsinto an existingfacilityis a
moreincrementalprocess,requiringattentionto
Box4
Saturn's"Committeeof99"
In earLy1982,GeneraLMotorsconcludedthatit
couLdnotmanufacturea smallcarcompetitiveLyin
theU.S.undertheexistingGMjUAWcontractandso
in 1983approachedtheUAWInternationaLwitht~e
ideaof expLoringa newapproach.ThisLedto the
formationof ajoint union-managementcommittee
(theCommitteeof 99becauseventually99hourLy
workers,engineers,managers,andunionrepresenta-
tivesparticipated)chargedwithevaLuatingthekey
successfactorsofworLd-classmanufacturing.This
joint studyteamstartedwitha clean-sheetapproach
asit expLoredandevaLuatedpracticesthroughout
theworLd.TheCommitteeproposedadoptionof aset
of neworganizationprincipLesforSaturnthat
embodypartnershiparrangementsfromtheshop
floorto thestrategicLeveLsof theorganization.One
of theseprincipLeswasthattheUAWwouLdbe
recognizedvoLuntariLyatSaturn.
Source:Adaptedfrom Rubinstein,Bennett,andKochan1993.
14
the norms and equitiesthat the incumbent
workforcehasbuiltup overtheyearswhile al-
lowingnewarrangementso emergeandflour-
ish. These norms and equities need to be
addressedaspartof thechangeprocess.
7. TOeffectivelyfacilitatetheimplementationof
newworksystemsinanexistingoperation,afacilita-
tormustlegitimizeandhelpaddresstheformaland
informalrightsandexpectationsamongstakeholders
whobenefitandwhoareatriskasaresultofproposed
changes.
A third-partyprofessionalhasa duty to
ensuredialogueregardingstakeholderinterests
thatmightnotberepresented"atthetable."Third
partiesalsohaveadutyto integratenewactivi-
tieswith existinginstitutionalarrangements,in-
cluding the industrial relationsculture and
climate,the natureof the union-management
relationshipitself,andthenatureof thecollec-
tivebargaining/agreement.
Workplace Dispute Resolution
There arewell-establishedprinciplesand
guidelinesforindividualservingin disputereso~
lutionroles.Therearealsolivelyandimportant
debatesunderwayabouthow thirdpartiesare
managingboundarieswith respecto statutory
employmentrights.Our focushereis not on
thesematters;theyarebeingaddressedin other
forums.Instead,weseektoprovideguidanceto
thirdpartieswhoareinvolvedin effortstochange
traditionaldisputeresolutionprocesses,uchas
arbitration,or who work at theboundarybe-
tweeninterest-andrights-basedisputeresolu-
tionprocedures.Theseinclude,butarenotlimited
to, experimentswith grievancemediation,at-
temptsto shift"in themoment"betweencon-
tractualgrievanceproceduresand alternative
disputeresolutionprocedures,andactingin the
capacityofadisputeresolutionsystemsdesigner.
For example,arbitratorshavelongdebated
thedegreeto which theirrole shouldbe nar-
rowlydefinedaroundthejudicialinterpretation
and applicationof the collectivebargaining
agreementor broadlydefinedaroundproblem
solvingwithpartiesin ordertobetterapplycon-
tractualanguage(Cox andDunlop,1950).In
recentyearsthejudicialviewhasdominatedthe
profession.Buttheresultisthatarbitrationserves
alimitedrole,enforcingthestatusquoin labor-
managementrelations.While thisroleis impor-
tant for ensuringequity and uniformity of
treatmentunderabargainingagreement,it does
little to helpidentifythe root causesof prob-
lemsin theworkplaceortohelpadaptcollective
bargainingtoitschangingcircumstances.In
the samefashion,mediatorsof collective
bargainingdisputeswere challengedin
recenttimesto performmediationtasks
relatedto grievances,which theyviewed
initiallyasoutsidethescopeof theirwork
andexpertise.
Webelievethereisaneedfor dispute
resolutionprofessionalstoemphasizeamore
clinical and flexibleapproachto dispute
resolutionif they areto fully servethe
diverseneedsof theparties.Absentexperi-
mentationandinnovationalongtheselines,
it is likely thatarbitrationandmediation
caseloadswill continueto shrink andan
importantresourcewill be lessavailableto
theparties.
8. Disputeresolutionprifessionalshavea
largerresponsibilityto workwith thepartiesin
redesigningtheirproceduresanddisputeresolution
systemstobetteraccommodatethetypesif issues
andconflictshatarisein today'sworkplaces.
Mediation of grievanceshasa long
and rich history in labor-management
relations.Asearlyasthe1950sInternational
HarvesterandtheUAW usedmediationto
rehabilitatewhat they referred to as a
"distressed"grievancesystemwith large
backlogs(McKersieandSkrapshire,1962).
DavidCole,anotherhighlyrespectedneutral
of anearliergeneration,discussedtherole
ofgrievancemediationin hisclassictreatise
on industrialjustice (Cole, 1963).In the
1970s,grievancemediationwasintroduced
intothecoalminingindustrytoaddressthe
problemsof wildcatstrikes(Ury,Brett,and
Goldberg,1988).Thereisalsoevidencethat
grievancemediationwassomewhatsuc-
cessfulin theOntarioconstructionindustry
in the early1980s(Whitehead,Aim, and.
Whitehead,1988).Out of theseexperi-
mentshasevolvedgrievancemediationasit is
appliedtodayin manysettings.
Guidelinesfor labormediatorsandarbitra~
torsarewellestablishedandshouldbeconsulted
by third-partyneutralstakingontheseroles.(See,
for example,theguidelinespublishedbytheNa-
tionalAcademyofArbitratorsandtheAssociation
of LaborRelationsAgencies.)While thespecific
featuresof theprocessvarytofitdifferentcircum-
stances,onegenericprincipleshouldapply:
9.Mediationofgrievancesshouldbedoneeither
(1)aspartofa negotiatedagreementthatoutlineshow
mediationfits intotheexisting rievanceandarbitra-
tionprocessor (2) byjoint agreementif theparties.
Box5
BalancingMultiple Goalsin
GrievanceMediation
Themediator(or in mycasethedirectorof
themediationprogram)mustdecidewhetherthe
primarygoal ofgrievancemediationis to settle
grievancesorwhetherit is to teachthe parties
to resolvedisputeson their own as an important
elementof a collaborativetabor-management
relationship.
As you mightexpect,I havesoughta middle
ground.Initially, I concludethat the primarytask
of the grievancemediatoris to settlegrievances.
Improvingthe parties'owngrievanceresolution
. skillsis important,butit is rarelythe central
reasonwhypartiesengagein grievancemediation.
Rather,theparties'centralgoaLis typicallyto .
resolvegrievancesmorequickly,inexpensively,and
satisfactorilythanis typicallydonein arbitration.
Hence,I instructmymediatorsto usecaucuses
(andothersettlement-orientedtactics) as
extensivelyas they think necessaryto achieve
settlement.
On the other hand,I also instruct mymedia-
tors to modelthe best elementsof coLLaborative
decisionmakingin workingwith the parties.The
primaryfocusis on interests,the searchis for a
solution that satisfiesthe centralinterestsof aLL,
andsolutionsaresoughtin the ideasand
suggestionsof the parties.My hopeis that the
parties,by participatingin what is essentiaLLya
collaborativeprocess,guidedby an expertin
collaborativedecisionmaking,will learnthe
skills necessaryfor an effectivecollaborative
process,andwill needto caLLon the mediator
lessand less.
Source:StephenB.GoLdberg,correspondencetotheTask
Force
Arbitratorsandmediatorsshouldensurethat
mediationprocessesareappropriatelydefined.In
caseswheregrievancemediationisbuiltintothe
parties'grievanceprocedure,it importantohave
clearrulesgoverningtheprocessandtheroleof
neutrals.Thepartiesalsoneedtobeclearontheir
goalsfor includingmediationasa stepin the
process.Box5illustrateshowStephenGoldberg,
the directorof a highly respectedgrievance
mediationprogram,seeksabalancebetweenthe
goalsofhelpingpartiestoreachasettlementand
buildingacollaborativer lationship.Whetherthe
partiesor theneutralintroducesthepossibility
of usingmediation,thepartiesmustbothagree
to engagein mediationfor it to be successful.
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Box 6 illustrateshow oneneutralexploredthe
optionofmediatingagrievanceshewasinitially
chosento arbitrate.If the mediationis not
successful,thearbitrator,inparticular,mustattend
to theparties'wishesregardingtheresumption
of the arbitrationprocessandwhetheror not
thearbitratorshouldwithdrawfromthecase.
10. Thirdpartiesmustbeawareif thebound-
ariesbetweenstatutoryrights,collectivebargaining,
anddisputeresolutionprocedures.Thirdpartieswho
helpresolveissuesthatcrossthisboundaryneedto
havedeepsubstantiveknowledgeof therelevantlaw,
aswellasexpertisein collectivebargainingprocedures
andworkplacepractices.
The matterof substantiveknowledgeof
thelawsinvolvedin adisputeisanongoingsub-
ject of debatein our field.SPIDR's TrackI
report,GuidelinesforVoluntaryMediationPrograms,
containsa fullerdiscussionof thisissue.How-
ever,it is criticalto cautionthirdpartieshere
once more that resolvingdisputeson issues
wherestatutoryandcollectivebargaining-based
rightsandproceduresintersectrequiresubstan-
tive and proceduralexpertisein the relevant
mattersof law,aswell asof rightsandproce-
duresflowing from the collectivebargaining
contractandworkplacepractices.
11.Thirdpartiesinvolvedin workplacealter-
nativedisputeproceduresin unionizedsettingsneed
to managetheboundarybetweentheADR and
informalndformalcontractualprocesses.
The grievanceprocedurewasdesignedto
resolveissuescoveredunderthecollectivebar-
gainingagreement.Todaymanyworkplaceis-
suesandconflictsariseoutof issuesnotcovered
bytheagreement(e.g.,adisputebetweenaman-
agerandan employeeoverproductor service
quality)and/oramongco-workerswhoseem-
Box6
The ChoicetoMediateDuring Arbitration
I wasservingasarbitrator
ona grievanceinvolvingthe
questionof whethersuper-
visorswereperforming
bargainingunitwork.I knew
thepartieshadtriedto settle
thegrievancethemselves.After
hearingsomeof theevidence,I
askedif theywantedto give
settlementanothertryor have
meattempto mediateit. Over
a Lunchbrea'k,thepartiestried
againto resolvethematter
themselves,butwerenot
successfuL.Theythenaskedme
to mediate.It wasagreedthat
if themediationwasunsuc-
cessfuLandeitherpartywas
uncomfortablewithmyre-
turningto theroleof
arbitrator,I wouldwithdraw.
TheCompanyhadrecently
introducedcomputersinto its
manufacturingprocessesand
neitherUnionnorManagement
wasableto definewhat
constitutedUnionworkin
thesechangedcircumstances.
Theoutcomeof themediation
wasa setof protocolsfor
mutuallydecidingwhatwas
Unionwork.
I donotknowwh.atmy
decisionwouldhavebeenhadI
heardtheentirecaseand
renderedanaward.It seemsto
me,however,thathadI ruledin
favorof theUnion,theCom-
pany'seffortsto modernize
mighthavebeensufficiently
constrainedthatboththe
Companyandtheemployees
wouldhavebeenadversely
impacted.HadI rendereda
decisionin favorof theCom-
pany,it seemsLikelythatthe
Unionwouldhavecontinuedto
file grievances.In sodynamica
situation,therewouldhavebeen
enoughvariationsthatnew
grievanceopportunitieswould
havepresentedthemselves.
In offeringto mediate,the
arbitratorIT)ustexercisecon-
siderabLecaution.Someparties
maybeuncomfortablewith
mediationin general;othersmay
beopento mediation,butnot
withrespecto a particularcase.
Therearegrievancesforwhich
thepartiessfmplyneeda
decision.In mostcases,if a
gentleinquiryregardingmedia-
tiondoesnotreceiveal']
immediateandreasonably
positive.response,thearbitrator
shouldceaseto pursuethe idea
andcontinuein hisor her
arbitrationrole.If theparties
indicatethattheymightbe
interestedin mediation,the
arbitratorshouldfirstnegotiate
groundrules,includingwhat
willoccurif themediationfails.
Willthepartiesseekto havea
newarbitratorappointed,for
example?
It shouldnotbeexpected
thatall arbitratorsarewilling
or ableto takeon'theroleof
mediator.Notall Laborarbi-
tratorsarecomfortablewiththe
ideaof mixingthetwopro-
cessesandnotall havemedi-
ationexperience.Whereboth
thearbitratorandtheparties
arecomfortable,however,
mediationmayofferpartiesthe
abilityto fashiona remedy
that is moreforward-Looking
andcreativethanthatwhich
wouLdbeavailabLethrough
arbitration.
Source:NancyE.Peace,correspon-
denceto the TaskForce
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12.Tofacilitateiffectivedispute
systemsdesignsutilizing ADR
processesin theorganizedworkplace,
thirdpartiesmustidentifyandinvolve
keyworkplaceparticipants(supervisors,
union stewards,past disputants,
representativeemployeeconstituencies)
in thefull scopeofthedesigniffort.
In unorganizedworkplaces,
mostADR systemsaredesigned
from the topdown;-without
sufficient involvement of em-
ployeesas active stakeholders.
While thismaybeproblematicin
anyworkplace,it isinappropriateanduntenable
in anorganizedworkplace.Trustin andowner-
shipof ADR processeshouldbe achievedby
involvingall thestakeholdersin thedesign,ad-
ministration,andongoingevaluationof work-
placeADR systems.
ploymentrightsmaybe covered
by an agreement but are in
conflict over noncontractual
matters(e.g., an interpersonal
conflict).Therefore,alternative
forms of dispute resolution
(ADR) arebeingusedto address
theseissuesin unionizedsettings
sideby sidewith existinggriev-
anceprocedures.An exampleof
one suchcaseis summarizedin
Box 7.One of thechallengesthat
arisesin thesesettingsis manag-
ingtheboundariesbetweenthese
twoprocesses.
These boundariescan be
ambiguousand, if not managed
effectively,canserveasan addi-
tional source of conflict and
mistrustat theworkplace.But if
managed well, they provide
disputantswithadditionaloptions
for effectiveconflictresolution.
Box7
DisputeResolutionDesign
Sometimeago,whileexploringthedetailsofa
memorandumof agreementcoveringtheuseof interest-
basednegotiationsto resolvetwosignificantcontract
clauses,I wassurprisedto learnthatthepartiesinsisted
ontheneedto agreeonwhatthedisputeresolution
processwouldbeif theeffortfailed.In thatparticular
instance,thepartiesagreedto submitheissuesto
bindingarbitrationif a reasonableffortoveraspecified
timeperiodfailedto producea comprehensiveconsensus
onbothclauses.Afteryearsof onlysometimesencour-
agingthepartiesto thinkthroughanddecidein ad-
vancethedisputeresolutionprocedureto beusedif
voluntarymethodsfailed,I havearrivedattheconclu-
sionthatsuchanticipatorydisputesystemsdesignis
cruciaL.First,I havefoundthattheparticipantsinthe
oftenvoluntaryalternativeprocessengagemorewhole-
heartedlywhentheyknowwhatwill happenif theydon't
agree.Second,theparticipantsoftenleveragekey
decisionmaking"in theroom"byopenlycallingto
everyone'sattentionthatcontrolof theoutcomewill be
cededto anoutsiderif theydon'tworkharderto finda
solutionthatall stakeholderscanlivewithandsupport.
A thirdbenefitofworkingoutthe"whatifs" fora
disputeat handseemsto bethatthepartiesoftenbegin
to managetheboundarybetweentheirrightsand
interest-basedproceduresmoreaffirmativelyfromthat
pointon.And,lastly,havingaplanfor thepossibilityof
anunsuccessfulADRapplicationmakestheexitfroman
interest-basedprocessandentranceintoa morerights-
basedonemuchsmootherforeveryoneinvolved,
includingtheneutraL.
Source:ChristinaS. Merchant
17
4
CollectiveBargaining
Collectivebargainingremainsthecentral
forumwherelaborandm;magementaddressthe
issuesmostimportantto eachparty.However,
practitionersareincreasinglyraisingquestions
aroundthedegreeto whichthetraditionalbar-
gainingprocessis sufficiento handlethecom-
plexandchallengingissuesthatconfrontboth
parties.Increasingly,managementandunionshave
multiplepointsof contacto addressi suesuch
asemploymentsecurity,productorprocessqual-
ity,andbusinesstrategy,whichmayhaveboth
collectivebargainingandnon-collectivebargain-
ingdimensions.In thiscontext,traditionalthird-
partyrolesaremorecomplexandnewrolesare
emergmg.
Wefocushereonthreecriticalrolesneutrals
playin contemporarycollectivebargaining:me-
diatingnegotiations,trainingfor andfacilitating
interest-basednegotiations(IBN), anddesign-
ingandfacilitatinglabor-managementcommit-
teesthatsometimesprecedeandhelppreparefor
negotiationsand sometimesfollow and help
implementnegotiatedagreements.
Mediationof ContractNegotiations
So much has been written on basic
principlesfor mediatingcollectivebargaining
negotiationsthatlitdeneedstobesaidhere.Basic
referencesincludeSimkin(1971)andtheCode
of ProfessionalConductfor LaborMediators,
jointly adoptedby theAssociationof Labor
RelationsAgencies(ALRA) andtheU.S.Federal
MediationandConciliationService(1964).The
presentcontext,however,challengesmediators
to reconsideranumberof traditionalprinciples
of labormediation.
13.Labormediatorsneedtoholdthemselvesand
theprocessaccountablefor achievingoutcomesthat
addresstheparties'underlyinginterestsandenhance
theirrelationship.
Within the labor mediationprofession,
thereis a long-standingdebateoverwhether
mediatorsshouldfocussolelyor primarilyon
immediateprocessobjectives(i.e.,gettingasetde-
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ment)or alsotrytoachieveparticularoutcomes
(i.e.,onesthataremutuallybeneficialand/or
addresstheparties'deeperunderlyinginterests
andimprovetheirrelationship).Whilethetradi-
tionalviewof labormediatorsfavorsthesettle-
mentfocus,thesuccessfuladaptationofcollective
bargainingasaninstitutionincreasinglyrequires
all theparties,includingneutrals,to designand
managetheprocessin amannerthatmaximizes
the likelihoodof achievinginnovativeandef-
fectivesolutions.
Therefore,webelievethatmediatorstoday
needto developthetechnicalknowledgeand
expertise,aswellastheprocesskills,tohelpthe
partiesachievethebestoutcomespossibleand
holdthemselvesandtheprofessionto thisstan-
dard.Qualityshouldbemeasuredbothin terms
of thesubstantiveoutcomes(i.e.,theextentto
whichtheparties'underlyinginterestsareserved)
and the quality of the ongoing relationship
amongtheparties.The commentsreportedin
Box 8fromseveral"customers"of theu.S. Fed-
eral Mediation and Conciliation Service
(FMCS) illustratetheimportanceof takingthis
approach.Box 9 illustratesthe needto probe
underneaththetraditionalissuesbroughtto the
bargainingtableto addressthedeeperandless
easilyformulatedconcernsof theparties,in this
casenursesandhospitaladministrators.
Interest-BasedNegotiations
TrainingandFacilitation
The conceptualrootsofIBN canbetraced
toWaltonandMcKersie's(1965)distinctionbe-
tweendistributiveandintegrativebargaining.
Distributivebargainingwasdescribedasnego-
tiationsoverissueswherethepartieshaveinter-
estsin conflict. Integrativebargainingwas
characterizedasproblem-solvingactivitieson
issueswheretheparties'intere~tspartlyor com-
pletelyoverlappedor wheremultipleissuesal-
lowed for maximizingthejoint utility of the
agreement.Sincecollectivebargainingwasseen
asinvolvingboth typesof issues,Walton and
Box8
Mediation of CollectiveBargainingDisputes
Twoexamplesthatarosein recent"cus- oninourindustryandthewayit affectsour
tomer"feedbackbriefingsheldbytheFMCS bargainingunits."Atanotherbriefinga
illustratethepressuresmediatorsareunderto managerfromasmallfirmthathadrecently
attendto thequalityof thesubstantiveand beenorganizedandnegotiateditsfirstunion
relationshipoutcomesof collectivebargainingcontractcommented,"Weareasmallstart-up
disputes. enterprisethatis still losingmoney.Wedon't
Atonebriefingautilityindustryexecutive projectaprofitforanothertwoyears.Thelast
said,"If youaregoingto behelpfulinour thingwewantedwasaunionora union
industry,ouhavetounderstandtheconse- contract,butnowthatwehaveonewewillfail
quencesofderegulation."Atthesamebriefinga if wedon'thaveagoodworkingrelationship
healthcareunionofficialcommented,"Ifyouare rightfromthestart.Mediationhasto helpus
goingto mediatehealthcaredisputes,youhad withthisnoworwewon'tbehereintwo
betterunderstandtherestructuringthatis going years."
Source:Participantcommentsmadeto ThomasKochanandJoel Cutcher-Gershenfeld,CustomerFeedback
Briefing,FederalMediationandConciliationService,Boston,April2, 1997;SanFrancisco,April 7, 1998.
McKersiedescribedit asa"mixedmotive"rela-
tionship.
LaterFisher andUry (1981)appliedand
popularizedtheWaltonandMcKersiemodeland
extendeditbyarguingthat"principlednegotia-
tions"(latercalledIBN) couldbeappliedtoany
issues,settings,or processes,includingcollective
bargaining.Sincethepublicationof theirinflu-
entialbook,IBN hasgainedwidespreadatten-
tion and considerableexperimentation.For
example,a 1996nationalsurveyof laborand
managementegotiatorsin theU.S.reportedthat
69%wereawareof IBN and41% hadexperi-
encewith it (Cutcher-Gershenfeld,Kochan,and
Wells,1998).
Rapid growthin awarenessandsupport
for IEN is creatingopportunitiesfor dispute
resolutionprofessionals.Care mustbe taken,
however,tonurturethisrelativelynewapproach
to negotiationsto avoidapplyingitsprinciples
andtools in waysthatleadto disillusionment
and/or actualharmto the interestsof one or
bothparties.
As GeraldMcCormick haswrittento the
TaskForce,"I havebeenawareof or involved
in perhapshalfa dozensituationslatelywhere
someone has gotten "Getting to Yes" as a
religiousexperienceand convertedlaborand
management.The resulthasbeena lossof the
perceptionof creativetensionbetweenthepar-
tiesandtheoverthrowof theleadershipof the
unionthatisseenasbeingin bedwithmanage-
ment.The newleadershipis electedOIlaplat-
formthatisstronglyopposedtosuchstuff.This
isthetypeof misuseofIBN weneedtoavoid."
Box9
SuifacingDeepIssuesof Interestin Health
CareBargaining
Collectivebargainingbetweenbargainingunitsof
nursesandhealthcareinstitutionsin theU.S.often
richlyillustratesthetensionbetweensubjectsof
bargainingregardedastraditionalto labor~manage-
mentrelations(wages,hours,andworkingcondi-
tions)andissuesthatstretchtowardthetypically
managerialresponsibilityof operatingtheenterprise.
Basedonscoresofnegotiationswithunitsof
registerednurses,myexperiencehasbeenthatthe
toughestissuesarerarelyeconomic,butratherhave
been"bestpractice"onessuchas"workingsafe"
withrespecto mandatoryshifts,overtime,or
patientload.Suchquality-of-serviceissues,often
non-mandatorysubjectsofbargaining,aretypically
embeddedinwhathepublichearsisaneconomic
impasse.Oneof thechallengesforneutralsworking
in thisarenais to accepthedepthwithwhichthese
issuesareofconcernto nursesasa professionand
to assistthehealthcareinstitution'srepresentatives
insharingsomeoftheirinherentpowerandcontrol
oversuchmatters.Thebestnegotiationshave
occurredwheretheinstitutionandthenursebar-
gainingunithave ngagedina"partnership"
approachto suchissues,utilizingjoint committees
andinterest-basedproblemsolvingastoolsfor
disputeidentification.andresolutionwellbeforethe
pressureof a loomingcontractexpirationdate.
Source:ChristinaS.Merchant
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14. Facilitators if interest-basednegotiations
processesshouldensurethatbothpartiesareadequately
trainedinappropriateskillsandmethods.
Experienceshowsthatsuccessfuluseof
IBN requirestrainingandactivefacilitationof
negotiations(seeBox 10),andawidevarietyof
Box10
IBN: AvoidingSimplistic"Wtn-Wtn"Formulations
Weareencounteringagrowingnumberof horror
storieswherepartiesaregivenwhatmightbetermed
one-dimensionalor overlysimplistictrainingaround
interest-basedbargainingskills.EssentiaLLy,problem-
solvingtools.areimportedalongwithpromisesthat
all issuescanberesolvingin a "win-win"way.
Inevitably,difficultissuessurfaceandtheprocess
doesn'tfuLLyanticipatetheuseof poweror outside
pressurefromconstituents.Sometimes,information
is sharedandthenusedagainstnegotiators.In the
end,partiesfeelthattheyareworseoff thanif they
hadstayedwitha traditional,arm's-lengthprocess.
Whilewedeeplybelievein the valueofjoint
problem-solvingandhaveoftenseentheenormous
potentialassociatedwitha searchfor mutualgains,
thisonlyworksin a contextwherethereis fuLL
attentionto thecomplicatedinstitutionalandpower
realitiesof coLLectivebargaining.Assuch,parties
shouldmakesurethat prospectivetrainersorfacili-
tatorsunderstandhowbargainingteamsareselected
withinunionsandbyemployers,howratificationis
conductedandall of theimportantdetailsalongthe
way.A basicissue,forexample,involvesanapprecia-
tion forthedemocraticstructureof unionsandthe
hierarchicalstructureof employers.Thismeansthata
newbargainingprocesshasto takeintoaccounthe
concernsof many.unionleadersaboutbeingre-
electedandtheconcernsof manymanagersabout
accountabilityto higherexecutives.Experienced
thirdpartieswhounderstandtheseinstitutional
realitiescanhelpto educateconstituentsonthe
natureandlegitimacyof newapproachesto coLLec-
tivebargaining.In fact,wehaveeachbeenaskedto
makesuchpresentations.Forexample,in a school
setting,anorientationto interest-basedprinciples
wasprovidedto thefull facultyandcommunity
officialsin advanceof applyingtheseprinciplesat
thebargainingtable.Suchpresentationsareonly
credibleif theyarerealisticaboutthedeepdisagree-
mentsthatcansurfacein collectivebargainingand
attentiveto institutionalrealities.Withsuchcau-
tions,however,professionalthjrdpartiescalihelp
facilitateinnovationin thebargainingprocess-with
informedsanctionandsupportfromconstituents.
Source:NancyPeaceandJoel Cutcher-Gershenfeld,
correspondenceto theTaskForce
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trainingprogramsis available.Although one
partyortheothermaybetrainedontheirown,
field researchclearlyshowsthatjoint training
hasthe highestlikelihood of producingout-
comesvaluedby both parties.Also,recallthat
thekey~ourceof distrustowardQWL efforts
wasthattheywereseenasvehiclesto advance
only management'sinterests.In theabsenceof
joint training,thesesuspicionswill carryover
to attemptsto introduceinterest-basednego-
tiations:Another reasonfor encouragingjoint
trainingisthatitprovidesacommonexperience
on which to build a joint relationship.The
examplesdescribedin Boxes11,12,and13il-
lustratethebenefitsof thiscarefulapproach;
15.Interest-basednegotiationfacilitatorsneed
toaddresstherolesofconstituentsin theprocess.
The singlemostcommonsourceof failure
in interest-basedprocesseslies in movesby
union or managem~ntconstituents that
undercuttheproblem-solvingeffortsofparties
atthebargainingtable.Facilitators,trainers,and
partiesneedtoeducateconstituentsabouthow
interest-basedbargainingworksandthe ways
constituentscontributeto the successof the
process.Failureto addresstheseissuesensures
theywill ariseatsomepoint astheprocessjs
carriedout.
16.Facilitatorsneedtoensurethatinterest-based
processesareadequateohandleissuesonwhichthere
aredeepconflictsoj interestandinwhichtheexercise
ifpoweris central.
Someproponentsof interest-basednego-
tiationshavebeenzealousin urgingtheuniver-
sal applicabilityof a single set of problem-
solvingmethods.Partiesarenot well servedif
theyaregiventheimpressionthatall issuescan
be resolvedwith "win-win" outcomes or
throughtheuseof anyonemethod.Too often,
partieshavebeen disillusionedwhen these
methodswereabandonedin thefaceof strong
usesof powerandotherleversor whenparties
wereleftworseoff thanmightotherwisehave
beenthecase.
While strongadvocacyof newmethodsis
required.tosupportexperimentationanddiffu-
sion,it mustbe temperedby recognitionthat
collectivebargaininginvolvesdeepeconomic
conflictsof interestandtheuseof powerasa
motivationalforce.Thus,a thirdpartyneedsto
assesswhen interest-basedapproachesareap-
propriateandwork with thepartiesto mix this
approachwithothers(asillustratedearlierin the
DisputeResolutionSpectrum).
-----.
Box11
Encouraging Interest-Based Negotiation in Canatkl
In 1994,theCanadianFederal
MediationandConciliation
Serviceinvitedvariousunions
andfirmsfromacrossCanadian
jurisdictionstoOttawatoshare
theirexperiencesregarding
mutualgainsbargainingin the
formatofa Roundtable.The
unionandmanagementpractitio-
nerscamefroma broadcross-
sectionof Canadianorganizations
andindustries(e.g.,Alcan,Bell
Canada,OntarioHydro,and
SaskatoonChemicals;theBroth-
erhoodof LocalEngineers,the
InternationalBrotherhoodof
ElectricalWorkers,theUnited
SteelWorkersofAmericandthe
UnitedTransportationUnion).
.Almostallofthepartieshad
hadlong-term,traditionalad-
versarialbargainingrelationships,
buttheyhadexperiencedsome
formofacatalystforchangethat
ledthemto attemptmutualgains
bargaining.In general,theparties
hadcometo realizethat,in an
increasinglycompetitiveenviron-
ment,thecostsassociatedwith
traditionalbargainingtacticsmay
betoocostlyforfirms(e.g.,
strikes).In addition,thereliance
onthird-partysettlements,while
resolvingovertconflict,often
resultedin solutionswhichdid
notmatchwelleitherparty's
mostpreferredsolutions.While
notall of theseattemptsat
introducingmutualgainsbar-
gainingworkedwell,thediscus-
sionattheRoundtablerevealeda
numberofjoint organizational
conditionswhichtendedto lead
to thesuccessof themutual
gainsbargaining,includingthe
benefitof:
.establishingjointunionand
managementtraining,.trainingatalLlevelsofthe
organization,-.developingarolefora
facilitatororaconsultantin the
trainingprocess,
. usinganoutsidefacilitator
in themutualgainsbargaining
processitself,.choosingafacilitatorjointly,
. realizing'thattrainingin
mutualgainsbargainingmay
requireconsiderablefinancial
resources,
. recognizingthatthetime
requiredto developa processcan
belengthy,and
. establishingoodcommuni-
cationsbetweenmanagement
andunionorganizations.
Source:ChaykowskiandGrant,1995
Box12
Interest-Based Negotiation in San Francisco Hotels
TheSanFranciscoHotelsPartnership
Projectwascreatedin 1994,involvingtwelve
unionizedfirst-classhotelsandtwoof the
city'slargestunionlocals.Theproject's
primarygoalsincludedincreasedmarket
sharefor participatinghotels,retentionand
improvementofjob$andjob security,and
newprogramsforemployeeinvolvement,-
trainingandcareerdevelopment.Laborand
managementagreedthattheyhada common
interestin raisingthequalityofservicein
thehotelsthroughjoint problem-solving,
increasedon-the-jobtraining,andthe
creationof opportunitiesfor advancement
withinandacrossparticipatinghotels.A
joint steeringcommitteecontrolsfundsfrom
statetrainingagenciesandemployercontri-
butions.
Problemsolvinggroupshavebeencreated
in eachhotel,comprisedof two-thirds
workersandone-thirdmanagers,with
facilitationbya neutralthirdparty.The
teamsdealwithissuesofjob design,
wOJkloadtraining,job security,andhotel
operations.A trainingprogramfor 1,600
workersin ten hotelshasprovideda com-
monfoundationin communicationsskills,
criticalthinking,problemsolving,and
teamwork.A recentpilotefforttrained160
workers,manyof whomworkin non-food
servicepositions,for certificationasbasic
banquetservers.Theseworkersareavailable
throughtheunion'shiringhaLLto anyof the
.participatinghofelsto helpalleviatethe
heavyworkloaddemandsduringtheend-of-
yearholidays.Futurestudyteamswill
exploreadditionalwaysto increasejob
stabilitythroughreferralsof part-time
workersacrossparticipatinghotels,in-
creasedtrainingandpromotionopportu-
nities,andworkredesignto accommodate
olderworkers. .
Theseinnovationsweretheproductof an
IB,Nfollowingtrainingandwiththefacilita-
tion of the FederalMediationandConcilia-
tionService.
Source:Kazis,1998
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Box13
Interest-BasedNegotiationsamongMultiple Parties:
TheDepartmentofEnergy'sNevadaTestSite
In early1994BechtelNationalInc. began
assemblingateamto respondtotheDepart-
mentofEnergy's(DOE)RequestforProposal
for asinglesourcemanagerof theNevada
TestSite(NTS).Ultimately,theBechtel
Nevadateamwouldinvolvea partnershipof
BechtelNational,Inc., LockheedMartin
Corporation,andJohnsonControls,Inc. . . .
ThelaborrelationsplanfortheNTShadto
addresscoordinatingtheadministrationof 31
laboragreements.Bechtelreachedoutto the
Southern'NevadaBuildingandConstruction
TradesCouncilandtootherAFL-CIOunions
representingemployeesat theNTSto secure
support[and]thebuildingtradesandthe
otherunionssigneda letterpre-committing
to negotiateaSouthernNevadaLabor
Alliance(SNLA)if BechtelNevadawas
awardedtheDOEcontract.
[After Bechtelwon the contract]. . .
severaljoint committeeswereestablished.
TheFederalMediationandConciliation
Servicewaschosenbythepartiesto provide
neutral,thirdpartyassistancein thetraining
andfacilitation.of threeof tnesecommittees:
theWorkRules,WorkAssignmentDispute
ResolutionProcess,andCommunications
Committees.
Buoyedbythesuccessesof theinitialyear
of theAlliance. . . laborandmanagement
committedto moveintothenextphaseof
theircooperativerelationship,usinginterest-
basedbargainingto negotiatethelabor
agreementshatwereto expireOctober1,
1997.
In Marchof1997,representativesfromall
of thecraftunionsandtheBNCmanagement
attendeda two-day,interest-basedbargain-
ingworkshopconductedbyFMCS.In early
April,theleadershipof thecraftunionsand
theBNCmetwithFMCSto formulatea
missionstatementandthegroundrulesfor
interest-ba~ednegotiations.
Negotiationsbeganin April,withbargain-
ing committeesformaintenanceandcon-
structionmeetingonestablishedschedules
everytwoweeksforfourto fivehours.
FacilitatedbytheFMCSthroughouthe
process,thepartiesaddressedeachandevery
contractarticleandsection,discussingtheir
interestsandconcerns,strivingto make
changesnecessaryto assurethegoals
outlinedin theirmissionstatement.. .
Duringthesenegotiationsonboilerplate
language,BNClaborrelationsandindividual
craftunionsweremeetingandreaching
agreementoncraft-specificissues.The
partiesall agreethattheseitemswere
completedin recordtimeandattributethat
rapidprogress(ascomparedto pastnegotiat-
ing history)to therelationshipandtrustthe
partieswerecontinuingto buildthroughthe
SouthernNevadaLaborAlliance.. . [0]n
September23,1997,[theparties]reached
consensusonthefinaloutstandingarticles
andsections,andthecraftsagreedto
recommendthecontractsto theirbargaining
units.
Source: RitterandMansoliLLo,1998,pp. 39-42.
17. Thirdpartieshave tostrikean appropriate
balancebetweenabandonmenta ddependency.
In manyinstances,partiesareexperiencing
interest-basednegotiationfor thefirst time.A
thirdpartywho providestrainingin IBN prin-
ciplesshouldadvisethe partiesthat a small
amountof trainingwill notbesufficientin the
absenceofadditionalfacilitationsupport.Assess-
ing how much additionalfacilitationmaybe
neededis an important'partof thethird-party
roleinbuildingtheparties'capabilitieswithIBN.
At thesametime,it isimportantohelpthepar-
tiesbecomeself-sufficient.It isprofessionallyir-
responsibletoremainin athird-partyrolelonger
thanneeded.
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Labor-ManagementCommittees
Workplace-levellabor-managementcom'-
mitteesestablishedtoresolveparticularproblems
ortoconsultonageneralbasishaveexistedsince
theturnof thecentury.Principlesfor governing
themarelikewisewellestablished.
Committeesareoftenusedto supplement
formalcontractnegotiationsin two ways.One
wayisto establishaspecial-issuestudycommit-
teelong beforethe startof negotiations.The
committee'sroleistoanalyzeacomplexissuein
depthandexploreoptionsfor addressingit,per-
hapsthroughconsiderabledatacollectionand
informationgathering.In thisway,problemsthat
would be difficultto resolvesolelyin a dead-
line-constrainednegotiationprocesscanbere-
solvedsatisfactorily.A secondwaycommittees
areoftenusedisto implementoneormorepro-
visionsof anegotiatedagreement.Manyprovi-
sionsarenotself-implementing,suchasajoint
safetyprocessor a productivityimprovement
process.Both typesof committeescanbe ex-
tremelyuseful.On theotherhand,all too fre-
quently,committeeshavebeenmisused.
18.Labor-managementcommittees,likework-
placeparticipationprocesses,houldbelinkedto the
collectivebargainingagreementand other labor-
managementforums so as to support (and not
undermine)thebargainingrelationshipandnegotia-
tionsprocess.
The scopeof thecommittee'sjurisdiction
(issues)andauthoritytoconsultordecideissues
shouldbeclarified.Neutralsoftenservein dif-
ferentcapacities-chair,executivedirector,fa-
cilitator, designer,advisor,or arbitrator of
unresolvedissues.Theserolesmustbeclearand,
as noted earlier, the facilitator must be
mutuallyacceptableto theparties.
19.Neutralsneedtoensurethatlabor-man-
agementcommitteeshavecleargoals,adequate
resources,andsharedcommitmentinordertoachieve
theirassignedmandate.
Too often labor-managementcom-
mitteesareestablishedasa convenientway
to takeacomplicatedissueoffthebargaining
table.Used in thisway,labor-management
committeescontributetocynicismandarea
poor use of .scarceleadershipresources.
However,many of the complicatedissues
facingpartiestodaycannotbe adequately
addressedwithout prior joint analysisor
ongoingjoint oversightandadministration.
Asaresult,facilitatorsandotherneutralsmust
holdpartiesaccountablefor theappropriate
useof thistool.Box 14describesanexample
of theredesignofseverallabor-management
committeesthathadbeencreatedorusedfor
thewrongreasons.
Box14
RedesigningLabor-ManagementCommittees
I recentlyworkedwitha
policedepartmentandunionon
improvingtheirlabor-manage-
mentrelationship.Management
toldmethattheunionwas
tryingto usurpmanagement
rightsthroughaveryextensive
systemofjoint committees.
Theuniontoldmemanagement
wastryingto useaLLofthe
committeesto sloughoff
managementresponsibilities,
especiallyondifficultprob-
lems.Weendedupdefining
threetypesof committees:.colLectivebargaining
committees(i.e.,grievance
committees)wheretherewas
jointdecisionmaking.
. partnershipcommittees
wherethedec:isionwasa man-
agementprerogativebutthere
wasanexplicitdesireto seek
unionsupportorconcurrence.
. advisorycommitteeswhere
hepurposewaspurelyto
exchangeinformationandideas.
Theseoperatedona consen-
susbasiswiththeassumption
that,if a consensuswasreached,
it wouLdbeimpLemented(since
thechiefwasdirectlyrepre-
sentedonthecommittee).
Wethenjointlycreateda
templatebasedontheseprin-
cipleswhichwasappliedto all
existingcommittees(weLLover
halfwereeliminated).It was
thenagreedthatthetemplate
wouldbeusedfor all future
proposedcommittees.
Source:GeraldCormick,correspondence
to the TaskForce
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5
StrategicLevel
In 1945,U.S. PresidentHarry Truman's
NationalLabor-ManagementConferencebroke
downin partbecausemployerswantedlaborto
agreethatcertainmanagerialissueswould al-
waysremainoutsidethe scopeof bargaining
whileunionleaderswereunwillingto agreeon
sucha limit. (The partiesalsoreacheda dead-
lockoverunionsecurityissues.)Sincethen,sub-
ject to legallimitson the scopeof bargaining
andthegeneralrductanceofeithermanagement
or labortoventuretoofarintomanagerialrights,
theboundaryofcollectivebargainiI].ghasgradu-
allyexpanded. .
In recentyearsthe boundaryhasbeen
blurredin mostlabor-managementrelationsand
crossedexplicitlyin others.This is becauseof
increasingrecognitionthatcriticaldecisionshap-
ing labor-managementrdationsandthe out-
comesof employmentrelationshipsaremadeat
highor"strategic"levelsof organizations,tradi-
tionallyoff-limitsfor labor-managementrela-
tions. At the sametime, neither labor nor
managementis comfortableoperatingin this
domain.
Mostmanagersandtheirconstituentstill
wanttopreservetheirautonomyanddiscretion
overstrategicissues.They arealsouncomfort-
ablewith bringingapoliticalorganizationinto
thehighestlevelsof ahierarchicalstructure.At
the sametime,the politicalnatureof unions
makesit verydifficultfor leadersto bepartof
decision-makingprocesses,which sometimes
mayproducedecisionsthatareunpopularwith
theirconstituents.Yet,increasingly,partiesfind.
it necessaryto overcomethesetensions.
Addressingtheseissuesis a criticalchal-
lengefor thirdpartiesworkingwith laborand
managementleadersin strategic-levelforumsor
structures.We will discussbrieflytwo emerging
typesof strategicinteractionsthatneutralsare
beingcalledon to design,facilitate,or in some
caseservedirectly:union-managementpartner-
ships and employeestock ownership plans
(ESOPs).
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Union-ManagementPartnerships
John SteppandThomasSchneiderdefine
union-managementpartnershipsandsomestart-
ing principlesfor guidingthemasfollows:"Al-
thougha wide rangeof possiblerelationships
canbecalledpartnerships,omeminimalcrite-
ria shouldbe metbeforeeitherpartyemploys
theterm.The scopeshouldembracemorethan
oneissuejointly selectedanddeemedworthy
by both laborandmanagement.The natureof
theinteractionshouldbeotherthantraditional,
adversarialcontractnegotiationsor right-based
contractadministration.The interactionshould
be of anon-goingnature,andtherelationship
shouldbebasedon theprincipleof reciprocity,
with both sidesbenefiting.This entailsparties
sharingrelevantinformationandutilizingprob-
'lem-solvingmethods.The arrangementmustbe
freelyIvoluntarilyenteredinto-with goodfaith
andhonorableintentions"(SteppandSchneider,
1997,55).
RichardWalton,JoelCutcher-Gershenfeld,
and Robert McKersie (1994)describepart-
nershipsasa mixtureof collaborativeproblem
solving(fostering)andhardorpowerbargaining
(forcing).Again, the mixed-motivenatureof
theseinteractionsrequiresskillful handlingif
theseprocessesareto be robustanduseful.A
major role for third-party facilitators and
designersof partnershipsi to assistheparties
in managingthesemixed-motiverelationships.
Partnershipsuchasthosediscussedabove
arein somewaysthe equivalentofJabor-man-
agementcommitteesthatfunctionatotherlev-
elsof therelationship-theyareindirectforms
of involvement.So,the sameprinciplesapply
here,aswellasseveraladditionalones.However,
partnershipsgofurtherbecausebydefinitionthey
addressdeepissuesthatgoto theheartofpower
andcontrolin theorganization-issuesthataf-
fectthelong-termlivelihoodof allstakeholders.
As such,thisrepresentsaclearexpansionof the
domainof traditionallaborrelations.
20. It is a thirdparty'sresponsibilityto make
partnershipnormsastransparentaspossibleregarding
toughissuesuchasviolationsofconjidentialit}jinfor-
mationsharing,orcontroversialunilateraldecisions-
<1ndthentohelpresolveconflictswhenthesenormsare
violated.
Box15
Dealing with Violation of
PartnershipNorms
A strategic-levelpartnershipcouncilof
severalyears'standingranintoaviabil-
ity-threateningseriesof issuesasthe
resultof unilateralactionbythemanage-
mentrepresentativesin proposingdispute
resolutionlanguagefor passageby
Congresswithoutadvancenoticeor
discussionwiththeunion.Outragewas
palpableduringthefirstmeetingafterthe
eventastheeffectof embarrassmentof
unionleadersto memberswasmentioned,
abrogationof theexistinglaborcontract
wasassumedgiventhecongressional
proposal'slanguage,andbetrayalof
assumednormsfor noticeandparticipa-
tion of unionleadersin strategicinterac-
tionwithCongresswasnoted.After
severalhoursof diatribe,thefacilitator
encouragedthepartiesto explorethe
underlyingcausesleaaingto thecalami-
. tousevent.
Asis sooftenthecase,astringof
moreminorviolationsof normshadnot
beenfedbackto theresponsibleindividu-
alsasa regularcourseof meetings.
Further,disputeshadbeenleftto fester
at locallevelswithoutinterventionbythe
strategicpartnership.Asa result,the
managementheldtheviewthattherewas
nopossibilitythattheunionwouldbe
willingto "partner"ontheseissues-and
sothemanagementpartneredwiththe
fundingsourcesinstead.Withthorough
discussionof respectiveinterest~,needs
andconcerns;thepartiesdevelopedand
agreedto a planof action,whichad--
dressedboththeneedto designjoint
interventionsin long-standingdisputesas
wellasfortheestablishmentof normsfor
regularcouncilmeetingfeedback,commu-
nication,andconflictmanagement.
Source:Confidential
This isadomainwherenormsarestillbe-
ing established.Inevitably,strategichoiceswill
bemadethatwill directlyunderminethespirit
orsubstanceofpartnershipactivity.Hardchoices
mustbemadein helpingthepartiestoproperly
balancedecisionsto abandontheprocess,hold
theprocesshostage,or confronttheissue.A case
exampleisprovidedin Box 15.
Managersmustsharewiththeirunionpart-
nersinformationthatin thepastwouldhavere-
mainedwithinmanagerialranks;theymustalso
be opento union influenceoverissueagenda
andresourceallocationdecisions,which tradi~
tionallyhavebeenlargelywithinmanagement's
control.Union representatives,in turn, must
acceptgreateresponsibilityandbewillingtobe
heldaccountablefor decisionsmadejointly and
for appropriatetreatmentof confidentialinfor-
mation.Box 16describesthefeaturesof oneof
theleadingexamplesofacurrentpartnershipin
Canada.
Employee Ownership
Employeeownershiphasgrownin recent
years.Someestimatethatin theUnited Sfates
alonethereareover12,000firms,coveringper-
hapsasmanyas11million workers,in which
employeesown30percentor moreof thestock
(National Center for EmployeeOwnership,
1997).Only a smallfractionof these,however,
extendanymeaningfulroleingovernancetothe
workforce.The majorityaremanagedin atradi-
tionalfashion.Experiencewith employeeown-
ershipsugg~sts,however,thatthemotivational
(asopposedto thetaxor wagereduction)ben-
efitsofESOPs requireemployeeandunionpar-
ticipation at all levelsof the firm. Box 17
describestheESOP in placeatAlgomaSteel.
21.Neutralsassistingin thedesignor imple-
mentationofanESOP shouldencouragecreation<1
appropriatemeans<1employeeandunionparticipa-
tioningovernanceprocessesattheworkplaceupthrough
tothestrategiclevels<1theorganization.
Third partiesincreasingly.findthemselves
"at thetable"whenfundamentalchangestake
placein organizations,uchas-theestablishment
of anESOP.Our recommendationis basedon
theunderlyingprinciplethatathirdpartyhasan
affirmativedutyto attendto the interestof all
relevantstakeholders-includingthosenotpart
of theintendedstructure.
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Box16
DevelopingaPartnershipat Bell Canada
Facilitationwasan
importantaspectof the
managementof mixed-motive
interactionsandtheevolu-
tion of a movetoward
partnershipin industrial
relationsandrestructuringin
thecaseof BeLLCanada.
HistoricaLLy,BellCanada
hasexperienceda fairly
traditionalrelationshipwith
its majorunions,including
theCommunicationsWorkers
of Canada(theCWC,which
mergedlaterwithtwoother
unionsto formtheCommuni-
cations,EnergyandPaper-
workers[CEP]andthe
CanadianTelephoneEmploy-
eesAssociation[CTEA]).
Competitivepressureswere
minimalin a heavilyregu-
latedindustry.Generally,
beforederegulation,tele-
phonecompanieswerequite
profitable,whichaffordedthe
majorfirmstheresourcesto
undertakeadvancedprograms
suchastrainingandem-
ployeeinvolvementwithout
thepressuresof animmedi-
atebusinesscrisis.However,
in the1990scompetitive
pressuresescalatedin the
telecommunicationsi dustry
astheprocessof deregu-
lationaccelerated.
DuringthisperiodBell
Canadandits unions
graduallytriedto create a
betterpartnership.Mutual
accommodationin three
areaswasnotable.First,the
companyestablisheda
separateCommonInterest
Forum(CIF)witheachof its
majorunions,themostly
blue-collarCEPandthe
mostlywhite-collarCTEA.The
CIFsconsistof threeor more
seniorexecutivesfromeach
side.Althoughthereareno
rigidrulesaboutmember-
ship,mostCIFmembershave
beenatthe presidentorvice
presidentlevel.TheCIFs
provideastructurewithin
whichleadersfrombothsides
canshareinformationabout
issuesof strategicimpor~
tanceto thebusinessandto
therelationship.
Thesecondinitiativewas
ajoint decisionto use
principlesof interest~based
negotiationsin collective
bargaining.Thetechnique
wasfirst introducedin 1990
andwasusedrepeatedlywith
bothunionsduringthe
1990s.
Thethirdinitiativewasto
collaborate,in workplace
reorganization,asavehicle
to enhancemployeeand
unioninvolvementin work
redesign.TheCEPputfortha
setof far-reachingproposals
for its involvementin work-
placereorganizationatthe
1990bargaininground.While
theseproposalswererejected
bymanagementa thetable,
thecompanyagreedata
subsequentmeetingin 1992
to formajointtaskforce
witheachunionto studythe
subjectandmakerecommen-
dations.BoththeCEPandthe
CTEATaskForcesonWork-
placeReorganizationrecom-
mendedadoptionofa planto
introduceemployeeteams
andthe creationof ajoint
company-levelsteering
committeeto overseethe
initiative.Theserecommen-
dationswereacceptedwith
somemodificationsbyboth
sides.Subsequently,
employeeteamswere
introducedin a numberof
worksites.
In theprocessof moving
towardajoint approachto
organizationalchangeand
adaptationat BellCanada,
boththemanagementand
unionsidesreliedheavilyon
trainingin awiderangeof
aspectsof humanresources,
especiallyconcerning
processissues,andutilized
theresourcesof external
third-partyneutralsto
facilitatethevariousstages
of theprocess.
Bythe late1990s,the
intenselycompetitive
environmentin thetelecom-
municationsindustryplaced
strongpressureson BeLL
Canada,andjob securityhad
becomea keyunion-man-
agementissue.Whilestrains
havedevelopedin the
relationshipandtheprocess
of workreorganizationhas
notproceededasoriginally
envisaged,thereremainsa
commitmentto ajoint
approachto labor-manage-
mentissues.
Sources: John R.Stepp,cor-
respondenceto the TaskForce;
VermaandChaykowski,1997;
Chaykowski,1996
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Box17
Employee Ownership at Algoma Steel
CoLLectivebargainingatAlgomais gov-
ernedunderprovincialegislation.Thetone
of coLLectivebargainingat thisorganization
hasbeen,asit hasgenerallybeenthroughout
theCanadiansteelindustry,veryadversarial
withlowlevelsoftrust.Algomaexperienced
a major13 weekstrike/lockoutin 1990and
wasclose tobankruptcyandDofasco,its
steelcompanyparent,expressedits intention
to write-offits investment.
Toresolvethe longer-termviabilityof the
firm,thethenPremierof Ontario,BobRae,
strucka taskforceto examinepossibilitiesfor
a businessrestructuringof Algoma.Aninitial
planforwardedbyDofascoto theprovincial
taskforcewasrejectedbytheUnitedSteel-
workersof America(USWA),whichthen
proceededwitha comprehensiver structuring
andownershiptransferplanof its own;it was
ultimatelyacceptedbyaLLparties,including
Dofasco,thebanks,employers,andother
creditors.Undertheplan,a newcollective
agreementwasestablishedwhichincluded
detailsof the restructuringandworkplace
redesignandaLLowedfor workerparticipation.
UndertheUSWAplan,theownershipand
controlof thefirmweretransferredto the
employees(AlgomaSteelInc. N.D.):.Theemployeesobtained60%control
overtherestructuredfirm.
. Theunionobtainedfourof thirteen
seatsontheboardof directors.
. Theemployeescontrol (througha vote)
anyfuturesale,merger,ordilutionof em-
ployeeownershipto lessthan50%.
Theplanalsoincludeda comprehensive
andfar-reachingprogramof management
andworkplacechangethatincludedthe
establishmentof hefollowingkeyjoint
structures:
. A senior-levelJoint SteeringCommittee
withthemandateto directthedevelopment
andimplementationofa workforceparticipa-
tionprocessandplansandprogramsto
redesigntheworkplace.
. AJoint TrainingCommitteewiththe
mandateto developacomprehensivetraining
planfor newemployees.ThisCommittee
completedits workin 1993andwassuc-
ceededbya union-managementJoint Train-
ing Board.
Otherelementsof thechangeprocess
includeextensivetraining,information
exchanges,andincreasedfocusonissues
suchasqualityofworklife,humanrights,the
re-integrationof injuredworkersintothe
workforce,andthedevelopmentof pay-for-
knowledgecompensationsystems.
Source:Chaykowski,1996
6
SocietalLevel
Moving fromthefirm or industrylevelto
the societalevelinvolvesopeninglabor-man-
agementrelationsto abroadersetof stakehold-
ersandsocietalinterests.Akeyroleoftheneutral
in thiscontextistoensurethatthebroadervoices
are involvedin labor-managementprocesses.
Thus,at thislevel,labor-'managementrelations
becomeahighlyvisible,multi-partyprocess.
One importantinstitutionaldevelopment
at thesocietalevelinvolvesjoint industrialor
sectoralmulti-partycouncilsorforums.In Canada
andtheUnited States,joint industrialcouncils
havebeenestablishedacrossuchdiverseindus-
triesasclothing,construction,railroads,foodre-
tailingand distribution,and communications,
includingsomedatingbackasfarastheendof
WorldWarI. Mostsectoralcouncilstendto deal
with issuesuchastraining,workerdislocation,
andeconomicdevelopment.While theseefforts
clearlyhavebenefitsfar beyondanyone indi-
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vidualorganization,needstendto varyacross
industries(GundersonandSharpe,1998).
Thereisalsoalonghistoryof regionalor
communitylabor-managementcommitteesor
councilsthathaveservedtoaddressi suesaround
labor-managementclimates,training,andthe
diffusionof innovation(Chaykowski,1998).For
example,in thelate1980sWisconsinsupported
the formationof a regionaltripartiteorgani-
zation (the Wisconsin Regional Training
Partnership)aimedatassistingdisplacedworkers
in the Milwaukeeareaaswell assupporting
developmentof humanresourcesthrougha
WisconsinManufacturingTrainingConsortium.
At times,governmentagencieshavecre-
atedlabor-managementcommitteesto solve
problemswithin a sector.Secretaryof Labor
GeorgeShultzsetup one in constructionin
1969-70.The Missile SitesCommissionof
'1961~7wasawell-knowncommitteethatdealt
with thespecialissuesof thatenvironment.
In recentyears,theCanadianfederalgov-
ernmenthassupportednumerousectoralcoun-
cilsaimedathumanresourceandtrainingissues,
aswell astheproblemof workerdislocation.
Two of the mostprominentof thesearethe
CanadianSteelTradeandEmploymentCongress
andthe Electrical/ElectronicsManufacturing
IndustrySectoralCouncil.
One of the majorissuesassociatedwith
broadermulti-organizationalforumsis thatthe
activitythatissupportedatthesectorleveloften
has direct or indirect linkagesto resultsof
collectivebargainingat the firm level. For
example,theexperienceof theCanadianSteel
TradeandEmploymentCongresssuggeststhat
positivecooperativerelationsat the firm level
areoftennecessaryto supportunion-manage-
mentcooperationatthebroadersectoralevel.
SomeCanadiansectoralcouncilshaveformally
undertakento establishlinkages(directand
indirect) between council programs and
individualworkplacesby formingjoint labor-
managementcommitteesin theworkplace(e.g.,
in the mining and electrical! electronics
manufacturingindustries).
Private Discussion Groups
Privatelabor-managementgroupsin the
UnitedStateshavealonghistory,datingbackto
theNationalCivic Forumthatoperatedin the
earlyyearsof thiscenturyandincludedJohn D.
RockefellerandSamuelGompers.And,evenin
theseearlyyears,neutralsuchasProfessorJohn
R. CommonsfromtheUniversityofWisconsin
provided staff expertise and/or helped to
facilitate.Throughout the 1970sand 1980s,
Box18
Neutralsand theWOrkof theBritish ColitmbiaLabor RelationsReviewPanel
In 1997,theGovernmentof British
Columbiaestablisheda LaborRelations
ReviewPanelthatwasco-chairedbytwo
leadingarbitrators.Themandateof the
committeewasto reviewtheB.C.Labor
RelationsCodeand,moregeneraLLy,assess
thestateof labor-managementrelationsin
BritishColumbia.Theworkof thecommittee
beganin 1997andextendedthroughto the
beginningof 1998.Theworkof thecommit-
teeproceededthroughseveralstages:first,
writtensubmissionswerewidelysoughtand
r~ceived;second,thecommitteeundertooka
rangeof publicmeetingswiththevarious
stakeholdersin industrialrelations;third,the
committeeundertookto developadiscussion
paperthatidentifiedthemajorissuesarising
fromtheworkof thecommittee;andfourth,
afterreceivingandconsideringcommentson
thediscussionpaper,a finalreportwas
writtenandsubmittedto thegovernment.
Therecommendationsof thecommittee
werebroadlydividedintothosethatrelated
to specificadjustmentstp the laborcode,
andthoserelatingto broader"innovative
solutions."Amongtheinnovativesolutions
wasa recommendationthatjoint industry
advisorycouncilsbeestablishedandthat
fundsbeallocatedforfacilitatorsto work
withinsectorsto developthemodelsunder
whichtheseadvisorycouncilswouldoperate.
In thecourseof its work,thecommittee
alsocommissioneda majorpublicopinion
pollonvariousaspectsof industrialrelations.
Whilethepublicopinionresearchindicated
thatthereappearedto beincreasedpolariza-
tion betweenbusinessandlabor,it also
revealedthattherewasbroad-basedsupport
for innovative mployee-management
relations-includingsuchpracticesas
employeeinvolvement.Thereseemsto be
publicsupportfor improvingthetenorof
labor-managementrelationsandneutralsare
wellpositionedto facilitatethis.
Source:Readyet al., 1998
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former Secretaryof Labor John T Dunlop
chaireda national-level"Labor-Management
Group"of CEOs andunionleaders.
Since1986,a groupof CEOs andunion
leadershavecome togetherin the Collective
BargainingForum.MalcolmLovell,presidentof
theNationalPolicyAssociation(formerlycalled
the NationalPlanningAssociation),chairsthe
forum.Thesegroupshavegenerallyprovenuseful
in enablinglaborandbusinessleadersto interact
in a private,informalsettingandfromtimeto
timeto developbroadstatementsof principles
on topicsof nationalimportance,includingon
the futureof collectivebargainingandlabor-
managementrelations.The goalof thesegroups
isto facilitatedialogue,exploreareasofpotential
agreement,clarifYareasofdisagreementeeding
furtherdiscussion,and,whenfeasible,makepublic
statementsthat encouragepositive labor-
managementrelations.
Neutralscancontributetosuchforumsby
facilitatingdiscussions,providingexpertise,or
draftingstatementsfor di~cussionby theparties
in searchof areasof potentialconsensus.In do-
ingso,th~etaskisbothto reflectheviewsof the
partiesand to movetheir discussionforward.
Addingvaluewhilefacilitating.suchaforumre-
quiresthe neutralto listenactivelyandatten-
tivelyto thediscourseamongtheprincipals,to
reflecttheareaswhereagreementamongthem
mightlie,andtobringresearchfindingsandnew
ideasto bearon the discussion.The facilitator
canbe a sourceof ideasbut in the endmust
seekconsensusamongtheparties.
22. Neutralsneedtoencouragecreationofmore
forumsfor dialogueamong7aborandmanagementrep-
resentativesoverthefuture if collectivebargainingas
wellas otherissuesif importanceto theirindustries,
communities,andsociety.
Fosteringincreaseddialogueamongthe
full rangeof stakeholdersin thefutureoflabor-
managementrelations(a role oftenplayedby
local chaptersof the Industrial Relations
ResearchAssociation)is especiallyimportant
todaygiventhe paucityof public debateand
understandingof theseissues.Asfacilitatorsand
asparticipantsin theseforums,neutralsneedto
promotenewideas,bringexpertiseto bearon
the discussions,earchfor areasof consensus,
andclarifYareasof disagreementthatwarrant
furtherdialogue.
Public Policy Commissions
or StudyCommittees
23.Neutralsneed toassistin broadeningthearray
if alternativesto consideronesthatmay havemeritbut
arenotwithintherangeif "acceptability"to laboror
management.Theyshouldalsointroducethefull range
if stakeholdersintodiscussionsofpublicpolicyissues.
Fromtimetotimegovernmentsa kneutrals
to serveon commissionsor studygroupsto ad-
viseonchangesin laboror employmentlawsor
relatedpolicies.Thisisaspecialopportunityboth
to build consensusamongthe stakeholdersin
thesemattersandto bringnew ideasinto the
policy-makingprocess.Indeed,it is thespecial
responsibilityof neutralsto do two thingsthat
thepartiesareunlikelyto do in mostof these
settings,namely,to considernewideasthatnei-
therlabotnor managementmayfavorandto
introducethevoiceof otherstakeholderswho
shareadeepinterestin workplaceissues.
In Canada,severalrecentimportantgov-
ernmentallaborrelationscommissionshavebeen
co-chairedbyneutrals.At thefederalevel,are-
view of Part 1 of theCanadaLaborCode was c
recentlyundertakenbya taskforcewhich,after
broadnationalconsultation,submitteda report
thatformedthebasisfornewlegislationt passed
by theCanadianHouseandSenatein 1988.In
1997,theBritishColumbiagovernmentestab-
lisheda LaborRelationsCode Review Com-
mittee,whichhasformed.recommendationsthat
arecurrentlybeforethe government(seeBox
18).In both cases,thegovernmentsoughtout
prominentneutralswhohadanestablishedrecord
of experienceandacceptabilityto both labor
andmanagement,aswell asa broadrangeof
experienceinprogressive/cooperativeapproaches
to laborrelations.
In theUS., themostrecentexampleof a
policy taskforcewasthe Commissionon the
Future of Worker-Management Relations
chairedbyJohn T. Dunlop (seeBox 19).
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Box19
The CommissionontheFutureof Worker-ManagementRelations(Dunlop Commission)
ShortlyaftertheClintonadministrationtook
officein 1993it createdtheCommissiononthe
FutureofWorker-ManagementRelationsto assess
optionsfor updatingU.S.laborlaws.Former
Secretaryof LaborJohn T.Dunlopchairedthe
commission.Its membersincludedthreeother
formercabinetsecretaries,aCEOof a largebusi-;
ness,a CEOof asmallbusiness,a formerpresident
of a majornationalunion,andseveralacademics.
TheDunlopCommissionsoughto breakthe
nearlytwenty-yearimpasse'overnationallaboT
policybyholdingnationalandregionalhearings.
Mostof thosetestifyingwerebusiness,labor,and
governmentleaders;researchersandneutralswith
longexperienceandrecognizedexpertisein
collectivebargainingandlabor-management
relations;orfront-lineworkersandmanagers
chosenasspokespersqnsforviewsadvocatedby
eitherbusinessor labor.Aftertwoyearsofstudyand
hearings,thecommission'srecommendations'were
issuedbutrejectedbybothbusinessandlabor;its
legislativerecommendationswerenotactedonby"
Congressortheadministration.Thecommission's
recommendationt expandtheuseofADRhasbeen
implementedbyseveralagenciesandcourts.It
remainsto beseenwhetherthecommission'swork
willinfluencefufurepolicydebates.
Thecommissionsoughtto finda middleground
on laborlawthatwouldberesponsive'tothe
problemsit documentedwithcurrentlaw(inad-
equateprotectionsforworkerseekingto organize
a unionandnegotiatefirst contracts,outdated
limitationsonemployeeparticipationin unionand
non-unionsettings,andlackof effectivemeansfor
enforcingandadaptingthegrowingarrayof
workplaceregulations).
Threelessonswerelearnedfromthelackof
supportgeneratedforthecommission'sworkand
recommendations:
. Therearedeeplyembeddedi eologicaland
substantivedisagreementsseparatingmost
Americanbusinessandlaborleadersoverthe
futureof collectivebargainingandlabor-manage-
mentrelationspolicy.Therefore,giventhebalance
of powerin theCongressandtheadministration,
therewasnoacceptablecompromisepossible
withintheexistingstructureof theLawor between
thesetwopowerfulinterests..Thevastmajorityof theAmericanpublicknew
nothingabouttheworkof thecommissionor how
theissuesbeingdiscussedaffectedtheirworkor
interests.Therefore,therewasnopoliticalcon-
stituencyoutside,of thewell-establishedbusiness
andlaborinterestgroupsengagedin'thepolicy
debateor urgingchange.
. Ideasthatwerenotlikelyto beof interestor
acceptableto eitherbusinessor laborwere'not
seriouslyconsideredorairedin thecommission's
hearingsorrecommendationssincethe approach
takenwasto searchforsolutionsto theproblems
thatwouldb~acceptableto thebusinessandlabor
communityorthatcouldbeviewedasfairtrade-
offsbetweentheseparties.
Thekeyimplicationsfromthisexperienceforthe
futurearethatbreakingtheimpassein laborpolicy
wilLrequire:
. ideasthat reframethe natureof the problemand
termsofthedebateandproposealternativesthat
causeallinterestedpartiesto rethinktheirviewsand
thatdonotappearto be"compromises"fromtheir
fixedcurrentideologiesorpositionsontheissues;.involvementof new"multi-party"voicesin the
policy-makingprocess,includingthevoiceof the
workforceandvotingpublicin orderto elevate
theseissuesto a higherpriorityandlevelof
visibilityin nationalpolitics,and'
. a solid theoreticalandanalyticalresearchbase
to supportnewthinkingandapproachestobreak
theviewthat laborpolicyis merely"special-
interestpolitics."
Source:CommissionmemberThomasKochan
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Conclusion:LookingAhead
This reportattemptsto capturethefron-
tier of neutralrolesin labor-managementrela-
tionsastheyareevolvingtoday.We expecthese
roleswill continueto changeasnewchallenges
andopportunitiesarise.Forexample,oneemerg-
ingroleforneutralsisservingoncorporateboards
of directorsasemployee-nominatedmembers.
This rolecallsfor manyof thesameprinciples
andskillsdiscussedthroughouthisreport.Simi-
larly,newrolesarelikelyto emergein thecon-
textof cross-nationaltradearrangements,uch
asNAFTA or theWorldTradeOrganization.In
thisrespect,heserecommendationsarethebe-
ginningofamuch-neededialogueamongpro-
fessionalsin disputeresolutionoperatingin
labor-managementcontexts.
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GuidiJ;1gPrinciplesfor DisputeResolutionProfessionals
Workingin UnionizedOperations
WorkplaceOperations
.Facilitating Employee Involvement and Workplace Innovations
1.The facilitatormustbe acceptableto both union and managementleaders'andto other key
stakeholders. '
2.The facilitatormustensurethat thejoint activitieshaveappropriate,formal sanctionvia the
colle\=tivebargainingagreementOr otherjoint policy documents.
3. Facilitatorsneed to ensureactivejoint '"ownership"of the process,
4. Facilitators'need to ensurethatmechanismsfor disputere~oh;ltionandother forms of due
processarebuilt into anyparticipativeinitiative.
FacilItating theDesignand OperationsofNew WorkSystems
5. It is inappropriatefor third-partyneutralsto assistemployersin settingup greenfieldsites
intendedin partorprimarilytoavoidunionization.Doingsodestroysth~facilitator'sneutralityand
acceptabilityin labor-managementrelations. .
6.Facilitatorsneedto assistthepartiesin reachingagreementsgoverningtheprocessfor decid-
ing whetheror notworkersin'anewfacilitywill berepresentedbytheunion.
7.To'effectivelyfacilitatetheimplementationof newwork systemsin anexistingoperation,a
facilitatormustlegitimizeandhelpaddresstheformalandinformalrightsandexpectationsamong
stakeholderswho benefitandwho.areatriskasaresultof proposedchanges.
Workplace Dispute Resolution
8.Dispute resolutionprofessionalshavea largerresponsibilityto work with thepartiesin rede-
signing their proceduresand disputeresolution systemsto better accommodatethe typesof issues
and conflicts that arisein today'sworkplaces. '
9. Mediation of grievancesshould,be done either (1) aspart of a negotiatedagreementthat
outlineshow mediationfits into the existinggrievanceandarbitrationprocess.or (2) byjoint agree-
ment of the parties. "
10.Third partiesmustbe awareof the boundariesbetweenstatutoryrights,collectivebargain-
ing, and disputeresolutionprocedures.Third partieswho ,help resolveissuesthat crossthisboundary
need to havedeep substantiveknowledge of the relevantlaw,aswell asexpertisein collectivebar-
gainingproceduresandworkplace practices. .
11.Third partiesinvolved in workplace alternativedisputeproceduresin unionized settings
need to managethe boundary betweentheADR and.informal and formal contractualprocesses.
12.To facilitate effectivedi~putesystemsdesignsutilizing ADR processesin the organized
workplace, third partiesmust iclentiJY and involve key workplace participants(supervisors,union
stewards,past disputants,representativeemployeeconstituencies)in the full scope of the design
effort. '
Collective Bargaining
Mediation of ContractNegotiations
13.Labormediatorsneedto hold themselvesandtheprocessaccountablefor achievingout-
comesthataddresstheparties'underlyinginterests;mdenhanc~theirrelationship.
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Interest-BasedNegotiationsTrainingand Facilitation
14.Facilitatorsof interest-basednegotiationsprocessesshouldensurethatbothpartiesaread-
equatelytrainedin appropriateskillsandmethods.
lS.lnterest-basednegotiationfacilitators'needto addresstherolesof constituentsin thepro-
cess.
16.Facilitatorsneedto ensurethatinterest-basedprocessesareadequateto handleissueson
which therearedeepconflic,tsof interestandin which theexerciseof poweris central.
17.Third partieshavetostrike.anappropriatebalancebetweenabandonmentanddependency.
Labor-ManagementCommittees
18.Labor-managementcommittees,likeworkplaceparticipationprocesses,houldbelinkedto
thecollectivebargainingagreementandotherlabor-managementforumssoasto support(andnot
undermine)thebargainingrelationshipandnegotiationsprocess.
19.Neutralsneedto ensurethatlabor-managementcommitteeshavecleargoals,adequate
resources,andsharedcommitmentin orderto achievetheirassignedmandate.
Strategic Level
Union-ManagementPartnerships
20.It is a thirdparty'sresponsibilityto makepartnershipnormsastransparentaspossiblere-
gardingtoughissuessuchasviolationsof confidentiality,informationsharing,or controversialuni-
lateraldecisions-andthento helpresolveconflictswhenthese'normsareviolated.
EmployeeOwnership
21.Neutralsassistingin thedesignor implementationof anESOP shouldencouragecreation
of appropriatemeansofemployeeand,un,ionparticipationin governanceprocessesattheworkplace
up throughto thestrategiclevelsof theorganization.
SocietalLevel
Private DiscussionGroups
22.Neutralsneedto encouragecreationof moreforumsfor dialogueamonglaborandman-
agementrepresentativesoverthefutureof collectivebargainingaswellasotherissuesof importance
totheirindustries,communities,andsociety. .
Public Policy Commissionsor StudyCommittees
23.Neutralsneedto assistin broadeningthearrayof alternativesto consideronesthatmay
havemeritbutarenotwithintherangeof"acceptability"to laboror management.They shouldalso
introducethefull rangeof stakeholdersinto discussionsof publicpolicyissues.
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